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VOLUME 18 DECEMBER, 1939 NUMBER 1
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1938-1939'
PERSONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
L EGISLATIVE and judicial activity in the field of muni-
cipal corporations during the past year has produced a
considerable amount of material of importance to those per-
sons having direct dealings with public agencies. In the leg-
islative field further inroads have been made upon the stat-
utory debt limitations of various political subdivisions. The
21/2 per cent limitation was removed in the case of school
districts constructing or improving and equipping school
buildings;2 and in the case of cities, villages, and incorpor-
ated towns, constructing or improving bridges and airport
hangars of landing fields.3
A law has also been enacted requiring municipalities to
ascertain the prevailing wage rates for all workmen em-
ployed upon public construction projects and to specify in
the contract documents that such rates must be paid by the
contractors to whom public work is awarded." Another act
passed by the legislature requires preference to be given on
public works projects to resident Illinois laborers who are
citizens of the United States or have received their first
naturalization papers. The latter statute reflects a growing
1 The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year but is published rather for the purpose merely of calling attention to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is that
of the judicial year, October to October, embracing from 369 Il. 232 to 371 Ill. 630;
from 269 Ill. App. 541 to 301 Ill. App. 216; and from 98 F. (2d) 833 to 105 F(2d) 1023.
2 I. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 113, § 44.2; Laws 1939, p. 845.
8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 113, §§ 44.8 and 44.12; Laws 1939, p. 844.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, §§ 39n-39s; Laws 1939, p. 568.
5 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, HI 269-275; Laws 1939, p. 567.
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antagonism toward aliens which is fostered and encouraged
by the "disclosures" of various bodies investigating so-call-
ed un-American activities and by war and unemployment
hysteria.
Powers and Immunities
During the past year, the Illinois Supreme Court was
again confronted with the difficult task of applying the lim-
itations suggested in the concept of "corporate purposes" as
a term fixing the bounds of constitutional municipal activ-
ity. In People v. Kelly,6 the court decided that land donated
for the site of a state armory was used for a corporate
purpose-a corporate purpose being defined rather vaguely,
and probably necessarily so, as "some purpose which is ger-
mane to the objects for which the corporation was created,
or such as has a legitimate connection with that object and
a manifest relation thereto." A definition of this sort will
obviously never embarrass the court and should allow that
flexibility of construction which the court regarded as desir-
able in testing the validity of municipal acts, although at
what sacrifice of certainty in the law remains to be seen.
In Burr v. City of Carbondale,7 the court held that bonds
issued as a donation to secure the location of the Southern
Illinois Normal University at Carbondale were issued for a
public purpose, but in Livingston County v. Weider,' the
court decided that bonds issued for the purpose of inducing
the establishment of a state reformatory at Pontiac were
not issued for a corporate purpose and were void. In a later
case, Norman School v. City of Charleston,9 however, the
court held in effect that a contract by the city of Charleston
which obligated it to furnish water to the Eastern State Nor-
mal School for a period of fifty years for a nominal consid-
eration of five dollars was not binding upon the city as it
did not serve a corporate purpose. The Burr case was ex-
plained on the ground that special statute had been enacted
by the general assembly expressly authorizing donations by
municipalities desiring to bid for the benefits supposed to
accrue from the presence of a state institution of learning
within the corporate boundaries of the successful bidder. In
6 369 1I1. 280, 16 N.E. (2d) 693 (1938). 7 76 IU. 455 (1875).
8 64 IIl. 427 (1872). 9 271 IlM. 602, 111 N.E. 573, L.R.A. 1916D 991 (1916).
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the Weider case, the court declared emphatically that the
construction of a reform school was a state and not a cor-
porate purpose and that no one would want to live near such
an institution with its "poisonous influence." The objections
of the court were summed up in the following words: "It
was the duty of the general assembly to determine, for the
whole people of the State, the necessity of a State Reform
School. Deciding it was necessary, the enterprise should be
promoted by the resources of the State. An offer to receive
a donation from a particular locality to secure its location
seems inconsistent and degrading to a state boasting of its
sovereignty, its wealth and its unbounded resources. . . . If
a public institution is needed, the whole State should be re-
garded, and it should be established where it will best pro-
mote the interests and well being of the whole people." A
state armory, by contrast, the court argued in the Kelly
case, would be an asset to a community since the presence
of the militia might tend to prevent destruction of property
by riots for which the municipality would be liable. Whether
the presence of a large number of soldiers in a city is an
unmitigated blessing might seem to be open to some ques-
tion, just as it might be questioned whether the Board of
Supervisors in the Weider case committed a grievous er-
ror of judgment in deciding that the county would benefit
by the location of a reformatory at its county seat. The
primary purpose in bidding for these state institutions, it
is submitted, is not that the bidders may share more largely
in the activities of the institutions, but rather the expecta-
tion that incidental profits will be realized from the flow of
business which will inevitably follow the institution with its
necessary personnel. Since the municipal authorities are
normally in the best position to determine what public func-
tions should be promoted by the municipality, the decision
in the Kelly Case, while perhaps not resting on the strong-
est grounds, is believed to be sound, though not altogether
consistent with previous judicial expressions.
The validity of the Illinois Housing Authorities Act was
upheld in Krause v. Peoria Housing Authority. ° This act 1
provides for the creation of municipal corporations to be
10 370 I1. 356, 19 N.E. (2d) 193 (1939). 11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 67%.
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known as housing authorities. 12 Municipalities are author-
ized by the Illinois Housing Authorities Act to enter into con-
tracts with housing authorities providing for cooperation,
loaning of employees, furnishing of municipal service to the
authority, and granting tax exemption. In return for these
services the municipality may make a service charge of 5
per cent of the amount of the rentals derived from the hous-
ing project during the first ten years and 3 per cent of the
rentals thereafter. The Illinois Supreme Court cited the ap-
proving opinions of courts in a number of other jurisdictions
in support of its conclusion that such projects serve a public
purpose by reducing blighted areas, crime, immorality, dis-
ease, and fire hazards. Although the Illinois Housing Author-
ity Act did not expressly provide for tax exemption of hous-
ing projects, the court held that such immunity was clearly
intended, and that in any event the authorities would be
exempt from taxation as charitable institutions under the
general revenue act.
The payment of special legal fees to a regularly em-
ployed attorney for a municipal corporation for work con-
sidered to be outside the scope of such attorney's official
duties is illegal, the court held in Woods v. Village of La
Grange Park,"5 if such work is in fact within the scope of
the duties incident to the office of municipal attorney. It
would appear that the only instance in which a salaried
municipal attorney could legally be paid fees in addition to
his regular compensation would be in the case of an appoint-
ment on a purely nominal retainer basis with express pro-
vision for additional compensation for services not of a speci-
12 Cities, villages, and incorporated towns having a population in excess of
25,000, and counties are authorized to determine the need for low cost housing and
slum clearance projects in their respective communities and to petition the State
Housing Board for a certificate verifying this need and empowering the petitioning
municipality to create a housing authority. The housing authority comes into
existence after the certificate has been issued and the presiding officer of the
municipality has appointed five commissioners to direct its activities. It is autho-
rized to acquire property, enter into contracts, accept loans and grants from the
federal government under the Federal Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq., issue
bonds and do certain other things with a view to the construction and operation
of low cost housing projects. The Federal Housing Act provides for loans up to
90 per cent of the cost of the project on the security of housing authority revenue
bonds payable exclusively out of the rentals from the project, and in addition,
authorizes grants in the form of annual contributions up to 33/4 per cent of the
actual project cost.
is 298 IlL App. 595, 19 N.E. (2d) 396 (1939).
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fied routine nature or upon the basis of a distinct limitation
upon the official duties of the office.14 It is also important
to note that a necessary corollary of the ruling by the Ap-
pellate Court would be that a municipality could not legally
employ outside counsel to render legal services reasonably
falling within the scope of the municipal attorney's duties,
unless perhaps it should appear that the regular attorney
could not act because of physical incapacity or the burden
of other municipal legal work. The practices which prevail
in this field might profitably be reviewed in the light of this
important decision.
In Schuler v. Board of Education'- the court held that
a loan of public high school books and laboratory equipment
to a private junior college with provision for joint use by
the high school and college, in consideration of the college's
agreement to cooperate with the high school board in the
development of facts which would aid the board in determin-
ing whether a public junior college should be established
was illegal under Section 20 of Article 4 of the Illinois Con-
stitution as an extension of credit to a private organization."6
Two cases were cited by the court as supporting its con-
clusions. In one of these cases, Murphy v. Dever,17 the ob-
jectionable action consisted of a proposal by a city to finance
the cost of constructing a track elevation project over a
public street with city funds, the railway company agreeing
to repay this cost in a series of annual installments. In
the other case, Washingtonian Home v. Chicago,"8 a statute
requiring the city of Chicago to turn over 10 per cent of all
its liquor license receipts to a private corporation author-
ized to receive prisoners sentenced for drunkenness, was
held a violation of the constitutional provision noted above.
On the other hand, in People v. Barrett,9 the court held
14 The salary paid to a municipal attorney is the only compensation to which
he is entitled for services reasonably falling within the scope of his official duties,
the court declared. Since there are no statutory duties incident to the office of
municipal attorney in the case of most public bodies in Illinois, the extent of the
duties attached to the office will depend upon the terms of the ordinance providing
for the office or upon the terms of the contract of appointment.
15 370 Ill. 107, 18 N.E. (2d) 174 (1938).
16 1 2 of "Separate Sections" of the State Constitution was also violated, the
court ruled. 17 320 Ill. 186, 150 N.E. 663 (1926).
18 157 Il. 414, 41 N.E. 893, 29 L.R.A. 798 (1895).
19 370 IMI. 464, 19 N.E. (2d) 340 (1939). Note, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 827.
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that a state appropriation to the widow of a state assembly-
man of the amount of salary to which he would have be-
come entitled had he not died between the date of his elec-
tion and the opening of the assembly, was primarily an ex-
penditure for a public purpose ana did not violate Section
20, Article 4 of the Constitution. The court held that the
legislature could pay moral obligations as well as legal
debts and that the appropriation in question was sanctioned
by long established practice. It should be noted, however,
that "moral obligations" are not susceptible of precise def-
inition and that if the legislature is to be allowed the latitude
suggested by this case, the constitutional restraint upon
the expenditure of public funds for private purposes is apt
to be applied rather weakly and capriciously. The really
important consideration which should govern in these cases
is whether the public body receives direct and substantial
benefits in return for the expenditure of its funds. If it does,
there is, of course, no donation and no loaning of credit, but
an exchange. This was recognized by the court in Maffit v.
City of Decatur,0 when it was held that a city's agreement
to pay cash to a private water company, to grant it a share
of the city's water rentals, and to vacate certain streets and
alleys in its favor in return for the use of the company's
reservoir was an exchange and not a loan or donation.
The minimum wage act for firemen2' was upheld in
People v. City of Springfield,22 over the objection that the
act indirectly imposed a tax for corporate purposes upon
the municipalities affected, without their consent and in vi-
olation of Sections 9 and 10 of Article 9 of the Illinois con-
stitution. The court held that "corporate purposes" within
the meaning of these sections do not include governmental
functions of state-wide concern but only matters of a local
or proprietary nature. This holding appears to be in accord
with previous decisions. 3 although it has been held that the
state legislature cannot constitutionally clothe nonmunicipal
officers with the power to impose tax burdens upon a munici-
pality even for governmental functions.24
20 322 Ill. 82, 152 N.E. 602 (1926). 21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 860 (d).
22 370 IlL. 541, 19 N.E. (2d) 598 (1939). Note, 27 Ill. B. J. 312.
23 People v. Board of County Commissioners, 355 Ill. 244, 189 N.E. 26 (1934);
People v. City of Chicago, 351 Ill. 396, 184 N.E. 610 (1933).
24 Lovingston v. Wider et al., 53 Ill. 302 (1870).
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Another decision rendered during the year, on a munici-
pality's power to use public resources for the purpose of
promoting nonpublic interests was Ginter-Wardein Com-
pany v. City of Alton. 5 An ordinance of the city of Alton
recited that a bridge running down the center of a street,
supported by posts which left a six-foot way on one side and
a nine-foot way on the other, was a hazard to traffic, and
authorized a YMCA unit with property abutting on the street
to build a concrete fill flush with the bridge in the nine-foot
passageway. In return, the YMCA agreed to grant to the
city a perpetual easement for the use of a corner of its
property so as to permit vehicular traffic to enter the bridge
from a fronting cross street at a forty-five degree angle
instead of the previous ninety-degree angle. This arrange-
ment, the court held, was merely a colorable attempt to
surrender a public street to exclusive private use, and was,
therefore, illegal. The recitation of benefits supposed to flow
to the city from the transaction was not conclusive upon
the court, according to the prevailing opinion. Three justices,
however, dissented. The decision rests entirely upon the
ground that the public's interest in city streets cannot be
defeated by a vacation in favor of a private person.26 This
decision should be compared with People v. Field & Com-
pan y, 27 People v. City of Chicago,28 Neilsen v. City of Chi-
cago,29 and Gerstley v. Globe Wernicke Company.3" In the
Neilsen case the court said that when a street shall be va-
cated is a legislative and not a judicial question and in
People v. City of Chicago, the court declared that it was not
its province to pass upon the reasonableness of an act of
the general assembly making a street vacation ordinance
duly passed conclusive on the question of public benefits to
be derived from the authorized vacation. In both of these
cases it was held that the vacation of a street could be
conditioned upon the payment of compensation by abutting
property owners, and in the latter case, involving the vaca-
tion of a narrow alley, the court was impressed by the fact
25 370 Ill. 101, 17 N.E. (2d) 976 (1938).
26 § 2 of the "Separate Sections" and § 20 of Art. 4 of the State Constitution
were not cited.
27 266 Ill. 609, 107 N.E. 864, Ann. Cas. 1916B 743 (1915).
28 321 Ill. 466, 152 N.E. 141 (1926). 29 330 Ill. 301, 161 N.E. 768 (1928).
30 340 Il. 270. 172 N.E. 829 (1930).
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that vacation would remove a hazard, reduce maintenance
costs, and relieve the city from possible damage claims. Ap-
parently the time and manner of vacating public streets are
only primarily legislative questions and the courts will reach
an independent determination on the sufficiency of benefits
to justify the vacation.
Police Power
Several cases involving the exercise of the police power
reached the Supreme Court. In City of Chicago v. Ingersoll
Steel Corporation,'1 the court held that the provision32 con-
ferring upon cities and villages the power "to direct the lo-
cation and regulate the use and construction of. . . machine
shops, garages," etc., does not authorize the licensing and
regulation of machine shops in connection with manufactur-
ing plants and not serving the public generally. Whether
there is any difference between such shops and public shops,
insofar as the need for regulation is concerned, is beside the
point, the court declared. The power to regulate the business-
es listed in the act extends only to such concerns as accept
business from the general public. A similar result was reach-
ed in Crerar Clinch Coal Company v. City of Chicago," in-
volving an attempted regulation of private garages. Whole-
salers dealing only occasionally with the general public have
been held exempt from municipal licensing.
3 4
The extent of a city's police power was also considered
in American Baking Company v. Wilmington,3 involving
the validity of a municipal ordinance requiring a fifteen-
dollar license fee for all vehicles used in the city for the
delivery of food, but exempting vehicles operating in con-
junction with licensed and inspected food-dealing establish-
ments. The complainants, seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of the ordinance, showed that their trucks were licensed by
the state and that their principal place of business, includ-
ing their trucks, was also inspected and approved under the
pure-food laws of Illinois and the United States. The court,
31 371 Ill. 183, 20 N.E. (2d) 287 (1939). 32 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 24, § 65.81.
33 341 Ill. 471, 173 N.E. 484 (1930).
34 City of Chicago v. Northern Paper Co., 337 Il. 194, 168 N.E. 884 (1929);
Eastman et al v. City of Chicago, 79 Ill. 178 (1875).
95 370 IM. 400, 19 N.E. (2d) 172 (1939).
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nevertheless, held the regulation valid and declared that it
was immaterial whether or not the ordinance was being
enforced against resident dealers as suggested on behalf of
the petitioners. In several previous cases the court had held
that a municipality could not discriminate against nonresi-
dents in the exercise of its regulatory powers, but the dis-
crimination involved was uniformly evident in the regulatory
provisions. The effect may well have been the same in
the instant case due to a tacit understanding that the ordi-
nance, though general in scope, would not be applied in the
case of local merchants. The possibilities for abuse of con-
stitutional rights in this sort of under-cover discrimination
should call for a more appreciative consideration than that
involved in the court's statement that an ordinance is not
void because of a city's failure to enforce it.
37
A Sunday closing ordinance came under judicial scrutiny
in City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian38 and was held unconstitution-
al. The ordinance in question made it unlawful to keep open
on Sunday any place of business except hotels, restaurants,
drug stores, tobacco stores, confectionery stores, news deal-
ers, ice dealers, garages, and moving picture theaters. The
proprietor of a community grocery store was convicted in
the trial court of violating this ordinance, but upon appeal
the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the
ordinance, as applied to the defendant, bore no substantial
relation to the health, morals, safety or welfare of the pub-
lic. It is not entirely clear from the decision whether the
court thought that it would be unreasonable under any cir-
cumstances to prohibit a business which is harmless and
inflicts no damage, or whether the objection lay in the par-
ticular classification employed which permitted businesses
to operate which would generally be considered more ob-
jectionable than a community grocery store. Two earlier
cases upholding more power to pass similar ordinances
were expressly overruled.3 9 A third case, Richmond v.
Moore,4o was also inferentially if not directly overruled in
36 See City of Elgin v. Winchester, 300 Iil. 214, 133 N.E. 205, 22 A.L.R. 1481 (1921).
37 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886).
38 369 Ill. 447, 17 N.E. (2d) 52, 119 A.L.R. 747 (1938).
39 City of Springfield v. Richter, 257 Ill. 578, 101 N.E. 192 (1913); City of Clinton
v. Wilson, 257 Ill. 580, 101 N.E.192 (1913).
40 107 Ill. 429 (1883).
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so far as it held that "the legislature has the sole power
to prohibit every kind of secular labor or business on Sun-
day, or such only as it may choose .... " This holding, the
court decided, was in direct conflict with the case of Eden
v. People,41 in which it was held that "not even the legis-
lature has the power to pick and choose as to what kind of
secular labor it will prohibit without reference to a proper
exercise of the police power." It is to be noted that the
decision in McPherson v. Village of Chebanse,2 upholding a
comprehensive Sunday closing ordinance was not comment-
ed upon.," In the light of the decision in the instant case, it
is evident that serious restrictions have been placed upon
the power hitherto supposed to exist with reference to the
prohibition of business on Sunday.
Zoning
Three zoning cases of minor importance were decided
by the Supreme Court during the year. In Johnson v. Village
of Villa Park,44 an ordinance which excluded undertaking
establishments from a "Class B Residential" district was
held unreasonable, capricious, and without substantial re-
lation to the general welfare, in view of the fact that public
museums, farming, hotels, greenhouses, and hospitals were
permitted in the district. A similar result was reached in
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Kingery,45 where a zoning or-
dinance excluded parochial schools from a district zoned as
"A Residential" but permitted single family dwellings,
churches, public schools, libraries, and truck gardens. The
immediate test applied in both of these cases was whether or
not the excluded uses were essentially different from and in-
compatible with the permitted uses so as to support a gen-
eral design for the protection of the public welfare in a par-
ticular area. The third case, Morgan v. City of Chicago,46
41 161 Ill. 296, 43 N.E. 1108, 52 Am. St. Rep. 365, 32 L.R.A. 659 (1896).
42 114 Ill. 46, 28 N.E. 454, 55 Am. St. Rep. 857 (1885).
43 Although the decision in that case did not indicate that there were exceptions
to the closing ban, the record disclosed that meat markets, drug stores, groceries
and barber shops were excluded. The only Sunday closing law decision clearly
sustained in the instant case was that in the Eden case, holding void an ordinance
which required barber shops to close while permitting merchants, druggists, and
butchers to remain open.
44 370 Ill. 272, 18 N.E. (2d) 887 (1939). 45 371 Ill. 257, 20 N.E. (2d) 583 (1939).
46 370 Ill. 347, 18 N.E. (2d) 872 (1939).
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held that an ordinance making an exception to the operation
of a previously adopted general zoning ordinance, pursuant
to a recommendation by the Board of Zoning Appeals, was
proper where the original zoning ordinance provided for ex-
ceptions in cases of unusual hardship. In an earlier case,
Welton v. Hamilton,47 the court had decided that the board
itself could not constitutionally vary the terms of a zoning
ordinance in situations involving elements of undue hardship,
because the standards by which its discretion was to be
guided were insufficient.
Mechanics' Liens
A municipality is not liable, the Supreme Court held in
Gunther v. O'Brien Brothers Construction Company,48 to a
subcontractor on a public construction project, because of
its failure to secure a statutory bond from the principal con-
tractor conditioned upon the performance of the contract in
accordance with contract specifications and upon the pay-
ment of all labor and material claims. This question had nev-
er been settled in Illinois, and in other jurisdictions a de-
cided conflict of opinion exists. In some jurisdictions, it has
been held that the municipality is not liable but that the
officers charged with the duty of securing the bond are liable
to anyone injured by their nonfeasance. In other jurisdic-
tions the municipality has been held, but not the offending
officers unless they acted fraudulently. It is believed that the
decision in the instant case represents the majority view.
However, the other aspects of this problem, namely
the question of possible liability on the part of municipal
officers whose failure to comply with the statute gave rise
to unprotected losses, remains unsettled. For the present, it
is apparently incumbent upon those who contemplate fur-
nishing labor or materials on public projects to ascertain
at their own risk whether the statutory bond designed for
their protection has been secured.
CORPORATIONS
In People v. Hughes,4 9 mandamus was sought to compel
the secretary of state to issue a corporate charter, under the
47 344 Ill. 82, 176 N.E. 333 (1931).
49 296 Ill. App. 587, 16 N.E. (2d) 922 (1938
48 369 IR. 362, 16 N.E. (2d) 890 (1938).
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"not for pecuniary profit" act,50 to a labor union. The court
said that prior to July 9, 1937, the petition might have been of
avail, but that by amendment of that date the legislature
specifically enumerated the classes of associations which
could be incorporated thereunder, thereby intending to ex-
clude those not mentioned. "Industrial or trade associ-
ations" were specifically included, but the court considered
the relator's proposed "Allied Federation of Labor" not to
fall within a proper definition of "industrial or trade associ-
ations," which has the commonly accepted meaning of com-
mercial enterprises and trades employing capital and labor.
Admittedly a labor union or federation of labor or laborers
does not fall within the definitition. Nor could the plaintiff
incorporate under the words, "other similar purposes," since
labor unions are not similar in fact to any of the things
named in the amendment.
In Kraft v. Garfield Park Community Hospital,51 the
Appellate Court upheld a judgment obtained by trial based
upon a contract liability of the Garfield Park Hospital, a cor-
poration for profit. The action was against the Community
Hospital, a corporation not for profit, expressly organized to
take over and continue to operate the original hospital. The
new corporation paid interest on a bond issue of the old cor-
poration for about three years and then paid no more. On
maturity of the plaintiff's bonds of the old corporation, he
brought this action against the new corporation on the theory
that the new one had by operation of law succeeded to the
assets of the old and thereby also assumed the debts of the
old corporation. While a by-law passed to make the trans-
action clear was considered by the Appellate Court in arriv-
ing at the conclusion, it was corroborative and not decisive.
The conclusion was reached that the new corporation was
liable without the necessity of direct assumption to pay the
old obligations on the "change of coat" theory, i.e., that
same individuals, same officers, same management, continu-
ation of same business in same place result not in a sale, but
in a merger, and that liability follows. Strange as it may
seem, the Appellate Court could find no Supreme Court de-
50 I. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 158.
51 296 IMl. App. 613, 16 N.E. (2d) 936 (1938).
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cision applicable and therefore cited as Illinois authority two
appellate decisions52 of similar import.
Illinois has long held to absolute nonliability of charitable
corporations for tort,5 3 disregarding limits, demarcations,
and exceptions developed in other jurisdictions. The South
Chicago Hospital case 54 consistently applied the rule, but the
case is of interest for the reason that upon the trial, the
lower court did not permit the hospital to present all the
facts and circumstances that would tend to prove that the
hospital was used only for charitable purposes. The Appel-
late Court held such proof not necessary since the charter
of the corporation was in evidence (showing no stock, no
dividends, no operation for profit) and was sufficient evi-
dence of its character and purpose, and in the absence of
contradictory evidence the law presumes the corporation to
be a charitable institution. The maintaining of a training
school for nurses who pay tuition or render services would
be of no effect.
Several attempts were made in the last year by not-for-
profit corporations to come within the beneficial cloak of
charitable corporations for tax exemption purposes. Oak
Park Club v. Lindheimer 5 is typical, and the language em-
ployed by the Supreme Court has turned back several at-
tempts to remove property of such corporations from the as-
sessor's lists. Many such corporations engage in laudable
community and charitable projects, beneficial to the welfare
of deserving families on the economic margins. Yet, since
the primary purpose of such corporations is not charitable,
nor is the corporate property used primarily for charitable
purposes, but rather for social purposes of the members,
neither the purpose nor the activities are sufficient to exempt
the property.
It is well to note Hall v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com-
pany5 - although the case involves primarily a practice
52 Acorn Lumber Co. v. Friedlander Box Co., 240 IM. App. 425 (1926); Chicago
Smelting & Refining Corp. v. Sullivan, 24 Ill. App. 538 (1927).
53 See Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 Ill. 381, 75 N.E. 991, 2 L.R.A. (N.S.)
556 (1905).
54 Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 M. App. 488, 17 N.E.
(2d) 1012 (1938). Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 518.
55 369 Il. 462, 17 N.E. (2d) 32 (1938).
56 298 Ill. App. 83, 18 N.E. (2d)'388 (1938).
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question-in which the Appellate Court holds that service of
process on a foreign corporation is not necessarily different
from service on a domestic corporation and permits leaving
a copy of a writ or notice with any officer or agent of the
defendant found in the county without requiring that an ef-
fort be made to serve the president first.57 Yet, in another
recent case,58 it was held that serving of officer or agent
whose relation to the claim in suit makes it to his interest to
suppress the fact of service, will not be good service as to the
corporation.
FAMILY
To lessen a hardship created by the so-called "Saltiel"
Law, the legislature amended the Marriage Act so as to per-
mit the issuance of a marriage license despite a positive re-
sult in the required medical test whenever it appears: (1)
that the woman applicant is then pregnant; (2) that the wom-
an applicant has given birth to an illegitimate child who is
then living, provided the prospective spouse makes affidavit
that he is the father of such a child; or (3) it appears that
the contemplated marriage may be consummated without
serious danger to the health of either party.59 A companion
measure seeks to protect the health of the family hereafter
by requiring a medical examination of every pregnant wom-
an to ascertain, and, presumably, to prevent, the presence of
pre-natal syphilitic infection.60
The nature of the fiduciary relationship between persons
engaged to be married received attention of the courts in
Kosakowski v. Bagdon61 with the result that hereafter gifts
between such persons will be prima facie presumed induced
by fraud and undue influence so as to compel the donee to
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 141.
58 Personal Loan & Savings Bank v. Schuett, 299 Ill. App. 421, 20 N.E. (2d)
329 (1939).
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 89, § 6a.
60 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 91, § 113a-c.
61 369 II. 252, 16 N.E. (2d) 745 (1938). In that case a daughter sued her step-
father to set aside a deed executed by her mother while engaged to the grantee.
The defendant, who subsequent to the grant, married the grantor, claimed the
conveyance was made for a valuable consideration. Held, plaintiff was only
obliged to offer proof of execution of the deed during the existence of the engage-
ment to make out a prima facie case that the deed had been secured by undue
influence without any necessity of showing that defendant was the dominant
party or that actual fraud was present. Farthing, J., dissented.
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prove the absence thereof if such gift is to be retained. In
earlier cases persons standing in the relation of attorney to
client, guardian to ward, parent to child, trustee to benefici-
ary, or agent to principal had been obliged to disprove the
prima facie presumption of fraud which arose upon mere
proof of the relationship and the transaction. In cases in-
volving the relation of husband and wife, however, the courts
had previously held that the person seeking to rescind the
gift between the spouses had to offer in addition some factual
proof that the donee was the dominant party before any pre-
sumption of fraud or undue influence could be indulged in. 2
While engaged couples are not yet husband and wife, it seems
unusual that a different rule should apply prior to the mar-
riage than will be followed subsequent to the ceremony.
Hereafter in actions for separate maintenance63 it ap-
pears settled that the court may also adjudicate property
rights between the spouses in the same fashion as occurs in
divorce cases.6 4 The doubt that existed as a consequence of
dictum contained in Decker v. Decker65 to the effect that
the court had such jurisdiction, and the clear cut denial
thereof in McAdams v. McAdams," has now been resolved in
Glennon v. Glennon,7 in which the Appellate Court pointed
out that since the enactment of Section 44 of the Civil Prac-
tice Act 6s allowing the joinder of several causes of action,
whether legal or equitable, in the same complaint, the ques-
tion of whether the court gets its power to pass on such ques-
tions from the separate maintenance statute69 or from some
other statutes70 is now rendered moot.
The state of the law relating to divorce, however, has
become disturbed in two particulars by the decision in Ber-
lingieri v. Berlingieri.7 1 The first involves the interpretation
of the residence requirement prescribed by Section 3 of the
Divorce Act.72 Heretofore, upon marriage, it was assumed
62 Scully v. Wilhelm, 368 Ill. 573, 15 N.E. (2d) 313 (1938); Mahan v. Schroeder,
236 IMI. 392, 86 N.E. 97 (1908).
63 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 68, § 22. 64 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 40, § 18.
65 279 m. 300, 116 N.E. 688 (1917). 66 267 Il. App. 124 (1932).
67 299 Ill. App. 13, 19 N.E. (2d) 412 (1939).
68 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 168. 69 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 68, § 22.
70 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 68, § 10.
71 372 Ill. 60, 22 N.E. (2d) 675 (1939), reversing 297 M. App. 119, 17 N.E. (2d)
354 (1938).
72 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 40, § 3, requires that plaintiff (1) reside within the
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by most lawyers that the wife's residence became that of the
husband and continued so to be until the husband's conduct
justified the wife's departure and the assumption by her of a
new residence. Consequently, in order to give the Illinois
courts jurisdiction for the purpose of divorcing the parties it
was essential that the injured party establish an actual home
in this state for the requisite period unless the marital domi-
cile was already within the state.7" In the Berlingieri case the
wife, who had been a lifelong resident of Illinois, married an
itinerant foreigner in the state of New York and shortly
thereafter went to California, apparently on a visit. While
they were there, the acts of cruelty relied upon occurred,
and the wife returned promptly to Illinois and filed her action
within three months from the date of the marriage. It was
held that she had complied with the jurisdictional require-
ments of the statute, though the court did not specify into
which type of case her particular situation fitted.74 In so
doing the court refused to adopt the principle that the domi-
cile and residence of the wife followed that of the husband,
necessitating the former's return to this state and continued
presence therein for the statutory period. Because of the fact
that the husband had not yet provided a home for his wife
and, from all indications, possessed none of his own to which
her residence could be transmitted, the decision was probably
justified. Whether the same result would follow if the non-
resident husband had a settled abode, though the wife had
not yet taken up residence therein, remains now to be de-
termined.
75
The Berlingieri case also casts doubt upon the definition
of the term "extreme and repeated cruelty" as used in the
Divorce Act. 76 Heretofore the defendant's conduct, to war-
state for one whole year next before filing suit, unless (2) the cause relied on
was committed within the state, or (3) one or both of the parties resided in this
state.
73 Way v. Way, 64 IIl. 406 (1872); Derby v. Derby, 14 Ill. App. 645 (1884).
74 It might be inferred that the holding came under either the general provi-
sion of "residence within the state for one whole year," treating the absence from
the state as a mere temporary leaving, or under the exception that "one or both
of the parties reside in this state."
75 On this question, the case of Bowman v. Bowman, 24 Ill. App. 165 (1887), not
referred to in either the Appellate Court or Supreme Court opinions in the Ber.
lingieri case, may shed some light.
76 IIl. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 40, § 1.
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rant absolute divorce, had to be such physical violence, re-
sulting in bodily harm, as would put the person against whom
the acts were directed in danger of life and limb.17 In holding
that defendant's conduct in the Berlingieri case was sufficient
to constitute a ground for divorce, the court said: "In the
instances described, she was subjected to physical abuse and
this is all the statute required.' '78 Comparison between the
acts allegedly committed by defendant and those found in
earlier decisions leaves doubt as to the necessity, hereafter,
of danger to life and limb.
79
Of further interest to the divorce practitioner is the
amendment to Section 5 of the Divorce Act regarding venue
which now permits the action to be brought in "any court of
the county, where the plaintiff so resides, that may have
jurisdiction to hear and determine divorce proceedings, up-
on written entry of appearance by the defendant, being filed
there."80 Such actions have been principally confined to the
circuit courts for the reason th-at the city courts, for example,
have had jurisdiction only where the parties were residents of
the municipality. 8' Persons seeking divorce without notoriety
may now utilize other more remote tribunals.82
The right of the surviving parent to the sole and exclusive
custody of his or her minor children, when the parent is a fit
77 In Wesselhoeft v. Wesselhoeft, 369 Ill. 419, 17 N.E. (2d) 56 (1938), the last
expression of the supreme Court of Illinois on the subject prior to the Berlingieri
case, the court said: "Cruelty constituting ground for divorce under the statute
means physical acts of violence, bodily harm or suffering, or such acts as en-
danger life or limb or such as raise a reasonable apprehension of great bodily
harm."
78 Berlingieri v. Berlingieri, 372 Ill. 60 at 63, 22 N.E. (2d) 675 at 677 (1939).
79 Two definite instances of violence appear in the Berlingieri case: one, a blow
on the face which, perhaps, blackened the plaintiff's eyes; the other, a blow on
the head driving hairpins into her head; neither of which, in the Appellate Court's
opinion, caused the plaintiff to fear bodily harm. The Supreme Court cited Tren-
chard v. Trenchard, 245 Ill. 313, 92 N.E. 243 (1910) in which a violent shaking on
one occasion, and a violent pushing against a door on another were held insuffi-
cient; Fizette v. Fizette, 146 Ill. 328, 34 N.E. 799 (1893), where only one act, a
shove nearly knocking the plaintiff off sidewalk, was clearly insufficient; and the
Wesselhoeft case referred to in footnote 77, in which a blow on the head leaving
a dent still present at the time of the trial, and another blow in the chest, knock-
ing plaintiff against a stove shortly after her recovery from pneumonia, were
deemed enough.
80 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 40, § 6, as amended by House Bill 103, approved
May 16, 1939.
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 37, § 333; Masure v. Masure, 171 Ill. App. 438 (1912).
82 Active use has already been made of the permission granted by this amend-
ment. See Chicago Tribune, Oct. 18, 1939, Vol. XCVIII, No. 249, p. 32, in which
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custodian, was vindicated in Kulan v. Anderson,8 in which
case a father, in a habeas corpus proceeding, successfully
challenged an order which required him to share such custody
with a maternal aunt, who, by the order, was given the child
for week-end periods. 4 The court distinguished the situation
from that arising in cases of divorce wherein division of
custody is expressly authorized by statute,85 pointing out that
in habeas corpus proceedings the court may only remand the
person into custody or else release him or her entirely.
MASTER AND SERVANT
Labor Law
The past year has witnessed the apparent establishment
of the rule that the Illinois Anti-Injunction Act"6 applies only
where an employer-employee relationship exists and that
where there is no dispute between an employer and his em-
ployees, strangers may be enjoined from interfering by
peaceful picketing with that relationship. 7 Although in both
the Meadowmoor s and the Swing 9 cases violence was in-
Judge Theodore Forby at Zion is quoted, concerning a case involving residents of
Waukegan, as follows: "It is very apparent that the act opens the door for at-
tempts to procure divorces in a surreptitious manner, and, unfortunately, modern
society is surfeited with people who like to look around corners to find a way
out of their predicament." See also Chicago Tribune, Oct. 31, 1939, Vol. XCVIII,
No. 260, p. 2, for a case involving residents of Chicago who secured a divorce at
Calumet City which fact remained secret for thirty days.
83 300 IlL App. 267, 20 N.E. (2d) 987 (1939), decided by First District, Second
Division.
84 Not so successful was the parent in People ex rel. Whalen v. Sheehan, 300
Ill. App. 228, 20 N.E. (2d) 809 (1939), decided by the First District, Third Division,
who sought modification of a similar order entered in a habeas corpus proceed-
ing, but which application was made too late, having been presented more than
thirty days after the entry of the original order providing for divisible custody.
That division of the Appellate Court expressed its opinion, though unnecessarily,
to the effect that the court did possess jurisdiction to enter such orders without
citing any Illinois case, but referring to decisions in Colorado and Georgia.
85 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 40, § § 14, 19.
86 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 2a.
87 Meadowmoor Dairies v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371 111. 377, 21 N.E. (2d)
308 (1939); cert. den. 7 U.S.L. Week 421; reh. den. id. 638. See note, 17 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW REVIEW 385. Swing v. The American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill. 91,
22 N.E. (2d) 857 (1939). The decisions turn substantially on the proposition that
the Illinois Act is similar to Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 52 (see
371 Ill. at 385, 386) and must receive the same interpretation as to scope (Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 41 S. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349 (1920);
in spite of clear differences in the wording of two statutes. See on this point the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Farthing in the Swing case at pp. 99-101.
88 371 Ill. 377 at 389, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939).
89 372 Ill. 91 at 93, 22 N.E. (2d) 857 (1939).
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volved which the court could conceivably have decided would
warrant the issuance of an injunction despite the statute,90
and although there was also present in the Meadowmoor
case a possibly enjoinable secondary boycott,9 it is apparent
from the decisions92 that the rule announced is not to be
considered narrowed by these facts. The two cases, in ef-
fect, overrule the pronouncement in Schuster v. International
Association of Machinists,93 that the Illinois act was broad
enough to cover labor activities of strangers. 4 The Illinois
rule permitting strikes for closed shops 5 was reaffirmed in
Hoffman v. Chicago Laundry Owners' Association," where
complainants, working under contracts at will, were given
the option of joining the defendant union or being dis-
charged.1
7
In Ledford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific
Railway Company," however, where there was no threat or
strike on the part of a union, the plaintiff switchmen were
held to have stated a cause of action where they alleged
that they had not been recalled from a temporary lay-off,
although they had not been discharged, while other workers,
members of the union, were recalled, in violation of the plain-
tiffs' seniority rights, all as a result of a conspiracy between
the company and the union to keep all nonunion men out of
jobs.
90 Cf. Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 245 N.Y. 260, 157 N.E. 130
(1927); Fenske Bros. v. Upholsters' International Union, 358 Ill. 239, 193 N.E. 112
(1934), would not prevent such an order.
91 371 Ill. 377 at 383, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939).
92 371 Ill. 377 at 380, 384, 391, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (1939); 372 Ill. 91 at 94, 97, 22 N.E.
(2d) 857 (1939).
93 293 Ill. 177, 12 N.E. (2d) 50 (1937).
94 A distinction was attempted by the Appellate Court in the Swing case, 298
Ill. App. 63 at 71, 18 N.E. (2d) 258 (1938). Note, 33 Ill. L. Rev. 722.
95 Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N.E. 389 (1912).
96 297 Ill. App. 441, 17 N.E. (2d) 994 (1938).
97 Cf. Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900). Interesting points
involving the validity of an agreement between the defendant association of
laundry owners and the defendant laundry union whereby the association agreed
to maintain a closed shop and the check-off system for the union in return for
which the union was to call strikes when needed to enforce the association's regu-
lation of the laundry industry, and the effect on the plaintiffs' rights of a virtual
monopoly of the labor market in the laundry field were avoided by the court.
See Hoffman v. Chicago Laundry Owners' Association, 297 Ill. App. 441 at 446,
17 N.E. (2d) 994 (1938). Cf. Curron v. Galen, 152 N.Y. 33, 36 N.E.. 297 (1897).
98 298 Ill. App. 298, 18 N.E. (2d) 568 (1939). Note, 27 11. B.J. 307.
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Respondeat Superior
The Appellate Court sustained a judgment on the basis
of respondeat superior under rather unusual circumstances
in Metzler v. Layton.9 9 The employer defendant was a fi-
nance corporation, the employee defendant, its general man-
ager. Plaintiff, a messenger boy, who had been sent to de-
fendants' office on several previous occasions on business,
entered the office on business during the course of a robbery.
He was locked up with the manager, and after the robbers
had left he and the manager freed themselves. The manager
pursued the robbers with a revolver, the plaintiff following.
As the plaintiff overtook the manager, the manager turned
and fired, injuring him. He also fired a second time inflict-
ing further injury. The court held that the manager was with
in the course of his employment and both he and his em-
ployer were liable.
Workmen's Compensation
The Supreme Court decision of Puttkammer v. Industrial
Commission'00 presents the common question of whether or
not a given injury is compensable. The deceased, a truck
driver, returning to his employer's coal yard after delivering
coal, came upon the scene of an automobile accident on the
highway, stopped and left his truck, and while carrying an
injured child toward his truck was struck and killed by an-
other car which collided with the wreckage. The court held
that the injury "arose out of and in the course of" his em-
ployment, that his act was connected with the driving of a
truck on the streets and highways, and his conduct, foresee-
able, even though his object in stopping was solely to rescue
the girl. Mr. Justice Wilson dissented without opinion. It
may be surmised that he had difficulty in seeing a causal con-
nection between driving a truck and the rescue of an injured
child. No matter how praiseworthy such an act may be,
assessing the damages therefor against the employer con-
stitutes a type of coercive philanthropy far in advance even
of the growing tendency toward broadening the liability of the
employer.
99 298 IMI. App. 529, 19 N.E. (2d) 130 (1939).
100 371 Il. 497, 21 N.E. (2d) 575 (1939). Note, 17 CuiCAGo-KENiT LAw REV w 399.
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A second case of great factual interest is that of Kijowski
v. Times Publishing Corporation,'' an Appellate Court de-
cision. Suit was brought against the paper at common law
by a boy, hired by the driver of a news truck to assist
him, for injuries sustained while riding on the truck. The
workmen's compensation act was pleaded as a defense, but
the court held that the relationship of master and servant
did not exist between the parties to the suit. The fact that
the Court sustained the refusal to give an instruction denying
recovery if the jury found that the newspaper knew and ac-
quiesced in the custom of drivers to hire assistants, is weak-
ened because justified on the ground that there was no evi-
dence from which the jury could find such custom.
Another Appellate Court case, Havana National Bank v.
Tazwell Club,1°0 dealing with procedure under the compen-
sation act, is worthy of mention. There the court held that
the employer may not pursue his action against the third
party for the death of an employee in the name of the per-
sonal representative of the deceased employee; also, that
Section 22 of the Civil Practice Act'01 does not apply to sub-
rogation rights of such employer, the provisions of Section
29 of the Compensation Act' being exclusive.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 10 5 through Judge
Evans, determined that an Indiana corporation, although op-
erating under both Illinois and Indiana compensation acts,
could not urge the limitations of the Illinois act upon the
Plaintiff employee of an Illinois corporation who had brought
a common law action against the Indiana corporation based
upon injuries sustained in Indiana. The court held that any
such limitation would have to be found in the Indiana act,
and since the Indiana act had no provision comparable to
Section 29106 of the Illinois act, there was no basis for holding
the employee to an implied agreement to abide by the Illi-
nois statute. This appears to be a case of first impression,
101 298 Ill. App. 236, 18 N.E. (2d) 754 (1939). Note, 17 CHIcAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 295.
102 298 Ill. App. 393, 19 N.E. (2d) 228 (1939).
103 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 146.
104 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 166.
105 Foster v. Denny Motor Transfer Co., 100 F. (2d) 658 (1939).
106 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 166: "Where an injury or death for which com-
pensation is payable by the employer under this Act was not proximately caused
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although an Iowa case 1 7 was cited as being closely in point.
The inference seems to be that had the injury been sustained
in Illinois, the limitation urged would have prevailed, and if
Indiana had had a provision comparable to our Section 29,
the plaintiff would have been bound.
In Morris Metal Products Co. v. Industrial Commis-
sion,' The Illinois Supreme Court has construed Section 25
of the Occupational Diseases Act0 9 for what would seem to
be the first time. The provision therein contained that "in
cases of silicosis or asbestosis, the only employer liable shall
be the last employer in whose employment the employee was
last exposed during a period of sixty (60) days or more after
the effective date of this act, to the hazard of such occupa-
tional disease, and in such cases, an exposure during a pe-
riod of less than sixty (60) days, after the effective date of
this act, shall not be deemed a last exposure . . . " was held
to require only exposure during a period of sixty days and
not sixty days of actual employment."0
PROPERTY
TRUSTS
Problems of trust administration occupied the attention
of the Supreme and Appellate Courts during the past year.
No striking changes in the law appear to have taken place,
but there are several cases of some importance.
In one case, Central Trust Company v. Harvey,"' the
decree of the chancellor appointing a successor trustee was
reversed for failure to consider the wishes of the benefici-
aries. In this case the beneficiaries desired the appointment
of a corporate trustee. Apparently, the chancellor did not
by the negligence of the employer or his employees, and was caused under cir-
cumstances creating a legal liability for damages in some person other than the
employer to pay damages, such other person having also elected to be bound by
this Act, or being bound thereby under section three (3) of this Act, then the
right of the employee or personal representative to recover against such other
person shall be transferred to his employer and such employer may bring legal
proceedings against such other person to recover the damages sustained, in an
amount not exceeding the aggregate amount of compensation payable under this
Act, by reason of the injury or death of such employee."
107 Henriksen v. Crandic Stages, 216 Iowa 643, 246 N.W. 913 (1933).
108 370 Ill. 292, 18 N.E. (2d) 899 (1939).
109 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, § 172.1 et seq.
110 Mr. Justice Orr dissented without opinion.
111 297 Ill. App. 425, 17 N.E. (2d) 988 (1938).
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hear reasons for the recommendation nor objections to the
individual trustee appointed. While the selection of a suc-
cessor trustee, in the absence of a power to appoint, is a
matter within the chancellor's descretion, the wishes of the
beneficiaries are ordinarily entitled to careful consideration.
Of course the intention of the settlor and the best interests
of the trust are factors which may outweigh the desires of
the beneficiaries, but since harmonious relations are import-
ant to proper accomplishment of the trust purposes, the ben-
eficiaries are entitled to be heard in the selection of a suc-
cessor trustee.
112
After a brief appearance in the Supreme Court, the case
of O'Connor v. Rathjel8 reappeared on the docket of the
Appellate Court for the First District."4 The complaint as-
serted a cause of action under section 14 of the Dram Shop
Act. 5 The defendant Rathje as trustee, had acquired title
to the premises wherein the liquor was sold, through fore-
closure proceedings. The complaint named as defendant
Frank C. Rathje individually, and as successor trustee. A
motion to dismiss was sustained as to Frank C. Rathje in-
dividually, but was denied as to Rathje as successor trustee.
Thereupon the plaintiff obtained leave to file an amended
complaint making "Frank C. Rathje, Successor Trustee"
party defendant. The jury awarded the plaintiff $35,000 dam-
ages and the court gave judgment on the verdict. The Ap-
pellate Court reversed the judgment, holding that a trustee
is liable individually for torts but is not liable in his repre-
sentative capacity. In view of the fact that the trial court
had dismissed the suit against Rathje individually; the court
rejected a contention by the plaintiff that the words "Succes-
sor Trustee" might be treated as mere surplusage. The rea-
son given for the nonliability of the trustee in his representa-
tive capacity was that the law will not allow the trust prop-
erty to be impaired through the negligence or improvidence
of the trustee.
It seems to be well settled in Illinois that a trustee is
personally liable for torts committed in the course of ad-
112 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 532, p. 1697; Scott, Trusts, § 108.1, p. 566.
113 368 Ill. 83, 12 N.E. (2d) 78 (1938). See 17 CHICAGO-KE.ENT LAW REViEw 66.
114 298 IIl. App. 489, 19 N.E. (2d) 96 (1939).
115 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 43, § 135.
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ministration11 and that the trust res may not be reached
directly in a proceeding at law by the injured person.11 7 The
first rule rests upon ordinary principles of legal liability. The
trustee is actor and owner. The second rule rests upon the
policy to which the court refers. In many jurisdictions it is
held that the trustee cannot be sued at law in his repre-
sentative capacity. 118  Logically, this result is reached be-
cause the common law does not recognize the trust as an
entity nor look beyond the legal ownership of the trustee.
This problem is primarily procedural.
Thus the trustee is a nonconductor of liability so far as
the beneficiary is concerned and the trust res is insulated
from attack in ordinary proceedings at law. There is, how-
ever, a recent tendency to permit the trust res to be reached
in equity where the trustee would be entitled to be indemni-
fied. 119 And there appears to be some tendency to hold the
trustee liable at law in his representative capacity.
120
In the instant case the difficulty seems to be that the
trial court dismissed the suit against the trustee individually.
The propriety of that order was apparently not before the
reviewing court. Unless this erroneous order was ineffec-
tive or void, it appears that the trial court was incapable of
proceeding further so far as the trustee was concerned.
The Massachusetts rule that stock dividends are to be
regarded as increases to corpus was reinforced as the law of
Illinois by the recent decision of the Appellate Court in the
case of Burns v. Hines.'2' This case presented an interest-
ing problem of interpretation. By the terms of the trust in-
strument the trustees were directed to invest and accumu-
late money in a separate fund until the fund amounted to
$500,000. When such fund had been accumulated the trus-
tees were to divide the fund into five equal parts and to pay
the income derived from each part to certain benefici-
aries. 22 The trust res consisted in large part of common
116 Restatement of Trusts, § 264; Everett v. Foley, 132 Inl. App. 438 (1907).
117 Wahl v. Schmidt, 307 Ill. 331, 138 N.E. 604 (1923).
118 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 732, p. 2163.
119 Ibid., p. 2169. 120 Ibid., p. 2165.
121 298 Ill. App. 563, 19 N.E. (2d) 382 (1939).
122 "Any net income derived from said Trust Estate that may remain after
paying the annuities hereinbefore provided for, including as much as may be
paid annually to Loretta A. Hines during said period of five years, as well as
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stock in the Edward Hines Lumber Company and shares of
beneficial interest in two common law trusts. The trustees
received preferred stock in the lumber company as a stock
dividend and proceeded to create the $500,000 fund out of such
stock. Each of the beneficiaries executed an instrument evi-
dencing her acquiesence in the action of the trustees. In-
come derived from dividends on such shares was paid quar-
terly to the beneficiaries for ten years until June, 1931. No
further payments were made because the assets of the lum-
ber company were appropriated to the claims of its creditors.
A decree holding the trustees liable for the losses suffered
was reversed. The Appellate Court, in a carefully considered
opinion, held that the word "money" was not used in a re-
strictive sense and that the trustees could properly segre-
gate other forms of property. It was said that under the
Massachusetts rule stock dividends were not income, and a
recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
was distinguished. 23 The court said that the Massachusetts
rule was still the law in Illinois, citing DeKoven v. Alsop" 4
as the leading Illinois case and distinguishing such cases as
Lloyd v. Lloyd 2 ' and Whiting v. Hagey,12 6 where the prob-
lem involved the distribution of stock of a separate corpora-
tion. In the absence of a manifest intention otherwise, the
Massachusetts rule was regarded as controlling. The court
finally held that the action of the trustees was proper under
the terms of the trust instrument when properly interpreted.
Although there was not a strict compliance in the sense that
there was not an "investment and accumulation," still there
was a compliance in spirit since the trustees could have sold
any other money received from the sale or distribution of any of the property
hereby conveyed, shall be invested and accumulated in a separate fund until
such fund shall amount to Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00). Whene
such sum of Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000.00) shall be accumulated
the annuities hereinabove directed to be paid to the sisters and the nephew and
niece of said party of the first part, shall cease, and said Trustees shall divide
the said fund into five (5) equal parts, and thereafter hold one of such one-fifths
parts in trust for each of the sisters of said party of the first part hereinbefore
named so long as she shall live, and pay over to such sister during her lifetime
the net annual income derived from such one-fifth (%) part."
123 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 56 S. Ct. 767, 80 L. Ed. 1268, 105 A.L.R.
756 (1936).
124 205 Ill. 309, 68 N.E. 930, 63 L.R.A. 587 (1903).
125 341 Ill. 461, 173 N.E. 491 (1930).
126 366 Ill. 86, 7 N.E. (2d) 885 (1937).
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the shares and reinvested in the same stock. It was also
held that an exculpatory clause would be a complete defense
since there was no wilful misappropriation.
The Supreme Court, in People v. Chicago Bank of Com-
merce,27 held that the owner of a special deposit, although
entitled to a preferred claim against the assets of an insol-
vent bank, was not entitled to participate in the securities
deposited by the bank with the Auditor of Public Accounts in
compliance with the provisions of the Trust Company Act.
This holding appears to give effect to the plain intent of the
statute128 to authorize corporations to act as trustees without
giving bond and to provide protection for the beneficiaries of
such trusts. The trust relationship which arises out of a spe-
cial deposit may well exist where a bank is not authorized to
act as professional trustee.
Two other cases are worthy of brief mention. In one
case the Appellate Court for the First District held that a
recital in a trust instrument that the beneficiary's interest
should be considered personal property was controlling
though the res was land and even though the beneficiary had
power to require the trustee to execute a conveyance to him.
Hence, a judgment against the beneficiary created no lien
upon the land. 12 9
In the other case 30 the court followed the holding in
Burton v. Boren'81 that the sole beneficiary of the trust who
is also the settlor has power to revoke or modify the trust at
any time. This case also involved the proposition that where
the settlor reserves a life interest and provides that upon his
death the trust shall terminate and the property shall de-
scend to his heirs, his prospective heirs have no interest
whatever in the trust property.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
The long awaited and much needed Probate Act ,132
which became law in July, 1939, has integrated the statutes
127 371 Ill. 396, 21 N. E. (2d) 303 (1939).
128 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939. Ch. 32. §§ 287 and 289.
129 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust & Savings Bank, 300 IlL
App. 329, 20 N.E. (2d) 992 (1939).
180 May v. Marx, 300 Ill. App. 144, 20 N.E. (2d) 821 (1939).
131 308 IM. 440, 139 N.E. 868 (1923).
182 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, §1 151 et seq.
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on Administration of Estates, Descent, Wills, Guardian and
Ward, Lunatics, Idiots, Drunkards and Spendthrifts, together
with portions of other acts closely related to the foregoing.
Previously doubtful language has been clarified and many
questions concerning administrative details have been
solved.
The Supreme Court in William v. Ivie3 3 laid another
stepping stone at the end of those leading away from the old
common law rule of wills that in the absence of an intention
to the contrary expressed in the will a lapsed devise passed
as intestate property rather than under the residuary clause.
An exception had previously been recognized in cases where
a partial or contingent interest in land was devised, leaving
a reversion undisposed of, in which case such interest would
pass under the residuary clause.' 4 The exception seems to
be not so much a case of a lapsed devise as a case of a re-
version which was not disposed of by any provision of the
will except a residuary clause broad enough to include it.
The Williams case dealt not with an undisposed-of rever-
sion, but with the entire interest in land which was devised
to a sister who predeceased the testatrix. According to the
old rule this would have been a case of a lapsed devise which
would have gone to the heirs of the testatrix; but the court
found language indicating an intention to make a gift over
under the residuary clause if the sister were not alive to take.
The devise was of all property to the testatrix's sister "if
she is living" at the time of testatrix's death. The next clause
gave certain of the lands to others if the sister did not sur-
vive. The land included in this clause did not cover the rest
of the lands which were not disposed of otherwise unless by
the residuary clause. No express language stated what
would happen to these lands if the sister did not survive, nor
did the residuum expressly include lapsed devises. The court
infers that, since there was an intent expressed that the sis-
ter should take only if she survived, it would follow that the
testatrix had in mind making a disposition on the failure of
the condition, and the residuary clause would include the
property undisposed of on failure of that condition. A ques-
18s 371 IM. 355, 20 N.E. (2d) 796 (1939).
134 Carter v. Lewis, 364 111. 434, 4 N.E. (2d) 853, 108 A.L.R. 458 (1936).
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tion is raised as to how long it will be before the next stone
is laid. It is only a short step now for a court to say that
since it is always possible for a devisee to die before the tes-
tator, it must be presumed that the testator knows that fact
and intends to make provision therefor by his residuary
clause.
In Hoffman v. Hoffman,135 the Supreme Court was again
called upon to decide whether or not a deceased who wrote
her own will intended her name, which appeared only in the
exordium clause as her signature. The court sustained the
Circuit Court, which had denied probate, holding that the
proponents, although showing the intention of the deceased
that the instrument should be her will, had not established
the requisite proposition "that the deceased intended her
name at the beginning of the purported will to be her signa-
ture to the instrument." She had neither made any state-
ment to that effect, nor did such statement appear in the
instrument itself.
136
The Illinois Supreme Court, in reversing the Appellate
Court decision in Gartin v. Gartin,137 definitely excluded
divorce as a ground for implied revocation of a will. It
seems improbable that a divorced man who has been obliged
to make a property settlement to his former wife would de-
sire to leave a will in her favor, but the Supreme Court felt
bound by the unambiguous language of the statute,"'s which
provided the only methods of revocation that can be recog-
nized.
Another reversal of an Appellate Court decision139 pin-
ned down another moot point which called for statutory con-
struction - whether descendants who take their parent's
share under the Statute of Descent140 can be charged the
debt which their parent owed the decedent. This was de-
cided in the negative. A new query now arises as to whether
135 370 Ill. 176, 18 N.E. (2d) 209 (1938).
136 See note, 27 II. B. J. 350, questioning the decision.
137 296 Ill. App. 330, 16 N.E. (2d) 184 (1938), reversed in 371 IM. 418, 21 N.E.
(2d) 289 (1939). Discussed in 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 97, 371.
138 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 148, § 19.
139 In re Bulliner's Estate, 294 Ill. App. 189, 13 N.E. (2d) 634 (1938), reversed
in Russell v. Bulliner, 370 111. 260, 18 N.E. (2d) 879 (1938). Notes, 17 CHiCAGo-KENT
LAW REVIEW 182; 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1013; 27 Ill. B.J. 277; 23 Minn. L. Rev. 975.
140 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 39, § 1.
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the change in language in the Probate Act of 1939141 will
affect the answer to the problem.
While it seems to have been tacitly assumed, research
discloses no case in Illinois which had expressly held that a
sale of personal property by the personal representative of
a deceased person, without approval of court as provided by
statute,42 was valid. This has now been judicially express-
ed in Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Mallers'43 by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for this circuit.
MORTGAGES
The familiar doctrine of Olds v. Cummings144 received a
distinct limitation in the case of Marks v. Pope."5 The Olds
doctrine, which has long been a stamping ground for lawyers
and judges alike, was distinctly repudiated as to one class of
negotiable instruments secured by a trust deed, when the
Supreme Court held that where bonds payable to bearer and
negotiable upon delivery are secured by a trust deed, the fact
that the original transaction was tainted with usury will not
be available as a defense in a foreclosure suit where the
plaintiffs are bona fide purchasers of the bonds. The court
follows the reasoning of Peoria & Springfield Railroad Com-
pany v. Thompson 4 6 and distinguishes between the circum-
stances involved in simple mortgages between individuals
and those where bonds are made payable to bearer and are
intended to be placed on the market. In the latter situation
the court is unwilling to deny to the security for such bonds
the negotiability and protection extended to any other nego-
tiable instrument, and this protection is found to exist in the
foreclosure suit as well as in the action at law. This decision,
although it does not overthrow the doctrine of Olds v. Cum-
mings, brings Illinois closer to the weight of authority and
adds a new and important exception,'47 in that it protects
141 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 162.
142 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 92.
143 104 F. (2d) 567 (1939).
144 31 II. 188 (1863).
145 370 Ill. 597, 19 N.E. (2d) 616 (1939). See "Negotiability of Illinois Mort-
gages," 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVmW 270; also note, 27 Ill. B.J. 346.
146 103 Ill. 187 (1882).
147 Exceptions to Olds v. Cummings:
(1) That it does not apply to corporate bond issues. Peoria & Springfield
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bona fide purchasers of bonds, where the same were intended
to be circulated in ordinary commerce, even though the bonds
were executed by private persons. The reasoning in this case
might well be extended to cover practically all trust deed
transactions.
The interest of general creditors in the personal property
of their debtors as against chattel mortgagees has been clari-
fied in the Appellate Court case of Collateral Finance Com-
pany v. Braud14 s The important point established by this de-
cision is that the protection given by Section 4 of the Chattel
Mortgage Act14 is extended at all times to all general cred-
itors and not merely to lien creditors. Their rights as against
chattel mortgagees become fixed at the date of recording, and
if the mortgage was not recorded within ten days of its ex-
ecution general creditors can assert priority over the mort-
gagee or anyone claiming through him, irrespective of wheth-
er or not the creditor's claim on the indebtedness accrued
before the execution and recording of the mortgage or sub-
sequent to it, and regardless of whether or not the mortgagee
secured possession of the property prior to the judgment lien
of the creditor. This point had not been theretofore ruled upon
by the Illinois courts, but it is in line with an established prin-
ciple protecting the interests of creditors in such circum-
stances.15 o
The always pertinent question of attorneys' fees received
further treatment in three Appellate Court cases which are
worthy of note. First, as to the recovery of attorneys' fees in
foreclosure suits instituted by the holder of one of a series of
notes in a split mortgage: Where the attorneys for other note
Railroad Co. v. Thompson, 103 Ill. 187 (1882); Peacock v. Phillips, 247 IIL 467,
93 N.E. 415 (1910).
(2) That it does not apply to accommodation paper, where that fact constitutes
the ground of defense. Foreman Trust & Sav. Bank v. Cohn, 342 Inl. 280, 174
N.E. 419 (1931).
(3) That it does not apply to latent equities of third persons. Silverman v.
Bullock, 98 Ill. 11 (1881).
(4) That it does not apply to collateral transactions between the mortgagor
and mortgagee. Colehour v. State Savings Inst'n, 90 Ill. 152 (1878).
(5) That it does not apply to actions at law on the note. Zollman v. Jackson
Savings Bank, 238 Ill. 290, 87 N.E. 297 (1909). See Reeves, Illinois Mortgages,
Ch. 13; also note, 27 Ill. B.J. 340.
148 298 Ill. App. 130, 18 N.E. (2d) 392 (1938).
149 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95, § 4.
150 See notes, 17 CHICAo-KEmN LAW REViEw 177, 27 Ill. B.J. 343.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1938-1939
holders have entered into the proceeding the case of Dreger v.
Boyer'51 establishes the rule that the attorneys' fees allowed
as a whole shall not exceed the fees which will ordinarily be
allowed the plaintiff in foreclosing the entire issue and that
the attorneys' fees allowed to the plaintiff should be commen-
surate with his interest. Illinois courts have in the past ap-
portioned the attorneys' fees between the parties, but the rule
in this case, by reducing the question to a matter of compu-
tation, is new. 152 The right of the mortgagee to foreclose the
mortgage in order to recover attorneys' fees theretofore ex-
pended in an action at law, and in which action a judgment
was had and paid, was sustained in the case of Washingtonian
Home v. Van Meter.'5' The mortgage provided that the mort-
gagor "shall pay the fees, expenses and disbursements incur-
red or paid by the mortgagee . . . in any suit or proceeding
wherein the mortgagee . . . as such, or as holder of said
notes, or any of them, may be a party either as complainant,
cross complainant, plaintiff or defendant, and that such fees
shall be an additional lien thereunder . . . " In view of this
provision, the court allowed the plaintiff to foreclose his
mortgage, holding that the obligation as to attorneys' fees
was as much a part of the security as was the indebtedness
evidenced by the notes. This decision does not present any-
thing new as to theory when the covenant in the mortgage is
taken into consideration, and will, of course, not affect all
cases where attorneys' fees are expended at law, but only
where the same are secured by the terms of the mortgage. An
order reducing attorneys' fees and granting other equitable
relief after the decree of foreclosure and after the term had
passed was upheld in principle in Chicago Title & Trust Com-
pany v. Maruszczak."4 In this case the reasoning of the Ap-
pellate Court as to the power of a court of equity to take juris-
diction over its decrees after term time for the purpose of
modifying or amending them is placed upon broad equitable
grounds and is worthy of note.
Extensions between subsequent grantees of the mort-
151 297 IIl. App. 581, 18 N.E. (2d) 87 (1938).
152 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 195.
153 297 IIl. App. 591, 18 N.E. (2d) 81 (1938). Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW
197.
154 298 IIl. App. 283, 18 N.E. (2d) 738 (1939).
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gagor and the mortgagee are always troublesome. Attorneys
in drawing mortgages or trust deeds should keep in mind that
a provision in the mortgage whereby the mortgagor coven-
ants and agrees to pay the indebtedness according to any
agreement extending time of payment will render the mort-
gagor liable on the indebtedness, although his grantee has
assumed the indebtedness and, with or without the knowledge
and consent of the mortgagor, more than one extension has
been had. The foregoing was made clear by the holding in
Brosius v. Madsen,15 which clarifies the case of Kent v.
Rhomberg."'6
Two cases of general interest contain discussions with
reference to the Civil Practice Act. In Chicago Title and Trust
Company v. Hotel Corporation,57 Section 50,158 which pro-
vides that the court may within thirty days after entry thereof
set aside any judgment or decree upon good cause shown by
affidavit, upon such terms and conditions as may be reason-
able, brought up the question as to acts done pursuant to or-
der of court prior to the end of the thirty-day period. The re-
ceiver in this case had served notice that he was presenting
his final account and report but did not give notice that he
was going to ask for an order directing him to pay taxes. The
appellant did not appear at the presentation of the final ac-
count, but, after the taxes had been paid and before the lapse
of the thirty-day period, the appellant presented a petition
which clearly showed that the moneys expended for taxes
should have properly been applied upon the deficiency de-
cree, and asked that the receiver be charged. The court held
that the receiver was not required to wait thirty days, and
that as an officer of the court his acts pursuant to order were
authorized.
In McKerchar v. Ayres,"' Sections 38 and 44 of the Civil
Practice Act 6 ' received consideration. In this case the de-
fendant mortgagor had a claim against the mortgagee, which
155 297 Ill. App. 94, 17 N.E. (2d) 229 (1938).
156 288 Ill. App. 328, 6 N.E. (2d) 271 (1937). In this respect, see also Chicago
T. & T. Co. v. Herlin, 299 Ill. App. 429, 20 N.E. (2d) 333 (1939), dealing with
similar provisions appearing in bonds.
157 300 I1. App. 200, 20 N.E. (2d) 871 (1939).
158 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 174.
159 300 Ill. App. 518, 21 N.E. (2d) 644 (1939).
160 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, §§ 162 and 168.
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he attempted to interpose as a set-off against the plaintiff as-
signee of the mortgage. The defendant claimed that by virtue
of these sections "all cross demands may hereafter be availed
of in any action, and the procedural propriety of a cross ac-
tion can no longer be litigated."'' The defendant, however,
did not make the mortgagee party defendant. As this set-off
fell within the well-established exception to Olds v. Cum-
mings that no collateral transactions between the mortgagor
and mortgagee may be interposed as a defense to the bona
fide purchaser,'162 the court rightly held that the sections
above did not apply to the foreclosure where the set-off did not
exist between the parties in the proceeding.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Three cases involving leaseholds should be noticed. It
was held in Eichenbaum v. State & Quincy Building Corpora-
tion'63 that the fee owners had a right to have the lease for-
feited where the court had entered a decree of foreclosure of
a trust deed on the leasehold and was operating the property
through a receiver, the owners having the right to have the
lease declared forfeited notwithstanding a provision in the
decree ordering that rents received be applied to payments
of taxes. Although the court had entered a decree of foreclo-
sure it still had jurisdiction, and since the lease was in default
according to its terms and had been cancelled by the fee own-
ers, the equity court in giving effect to the terms of the lease
was not declaring a forfeiture but was only recognizing that
the owners had already forfeited the leasehold.
Anticipatory damages were refused in People v. West
Town State Bank,6 where a lessor sought to recover from
a bank receiver under a forty-five year lease to the bank. The
receiver had abandoned the lease after taking it over, and it
was held that lessor was entitled to all damages accruing up
to and including the time of hearing. There being no stipula-
tion in lease as to what amount would be considered as dam-
ages upon abandonment, it was held that anticipatory dam-
161 E. R. Sunderland, "Observations on the Illinois civil Practice Act," 28 IlL.
L. Rev. 861, 868.
162 See n. 138, supra.
163 297 Ill. App. 460, 17 N.E. (2d) 979 (1938).
164 299 Ill. App. 242, 20 N.E. (2d) 156 (1939). Note, 17 CHicAco-KENqT LAW
REmw 289.
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ages could not be allowed then because of lack of certainty
and of proof. Otherwise final distribution of assets of the re-
ceivership would have had to be postponed for over thirty
years, and the purpose of the receivership would have been
defeated.
In the case of Realty Company v. Chicago City Bank and
Trust Company,165 it was held that a tenant, under a ninety-
nine year lease containing a covenant for quiet enjoyment,
may pay taxes and deduct the amount from rent, for the land-
lord is bound by his covenant to protect the tenant from all
paramount claims. A proceeding for tax receivership was
pending because of unpaid taxes which were liens on the
property at the time the lease was given. The lessees were
given authority to proceed in equity to accumulate rents and
to apply them to delinquent taxes where the lessors had
served notice to terminate the lease for failure to pay rent,
it being shown that full rentals had been deposited with the
clerk of the court to be applied to tax payments.
TITLES
In Saunders v. Saunders,166 a woman, who owned land as
tenant in severalty, executed a deed, joined in by her husband,
in which the grantors attempted to reserve to themselves a
life estate. The Appellate Court held that the husband had no
interest in the land upon his survival of his wife, since the
only interest he had at the time of conveyance was home-
stead or inchoate right of dower, which rights he conveyed,
and that, although he had a life estate during the life of his
wife, upon her death all his interest in the premises ceased.
The court's decision seems sound in theory, although con-
trary to dictum in earlier Supreme Court cases,'167 since a
reservation cannot be made in favor of a stranger to the title
at the time of the attempted reservation.
The Illinois Supreme Court, in Naiburg v. Hendriksen,'68
held that a joint tenant's contract to convey operates, in
165 299 Il. App. 297, 20 N.E. (2d) 162 (1939).
166 300 Il. App. 368, 21 N.E. (2d) 34 (1939). Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
378.
167 DuBois v. Judy, 291 Ill. 340, 126 N.E. 104 (1920); White v. Willard, 232 Ill.
464, 83 N.E. 954 (1908).
168 370 Ill. 502, 19 N.E. (2d) 348 (1939). Notes, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1186; 33 Ill. L.
Rev. 965; 17 CHrcAGO-KEprT LAW REVIEW 393.
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equity, as a severance of the joint tenancy, and that a con-
veyance by one joint tenant of his interest in land registered
under the Torrens System severed the joint tenancy not-
withstanding the grantee's failure to have the deed registered
until after the death of the grantor. 16
This is the first time that this precise point has been be-
fore the Illinois Supreme Court, and the opinion is well con-
sidered and will probably be followed by that court in the fu-
ture. 17 Occasions may arise, however, where the joint ten-
ancy may unwittingly be severed. In the case of Lawler v.
Byrne,'171 where one of the joint tenants had conveyed her in-
terest in the property, the court properly held the estate
severed, but as a matter of dictum added that the authorities
are abundant that a joint tenancy may be severed by one of
the joint tenants mortgaging his interest to a stranger.
Nothing has been found to establish finally that the mak-
ing of a lease by one joint tenant for a term which expires be-
fore the death of either of the joint tenants will operate to
sever the estate or merely to suspend it. 172 If the language of
the decision just rendered is to be followed strictly, however,
and the court continues in its opinion that the making of a
lease or contract severs the joint estate, the subsequent ex-
piration of the lease or cancellation of the contract would
not serve to restore the estate, as the statute is clear that the
estate can be created only by language in the conveyance
clearly establishing the right of survivorship.7 8
A tendency sufficiently liberal to be noteworthy was
evinced by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Albers v.
169 A divorced husband, joint tenant with his former wife, conveyed to a third
person, who reconveyed to the second wife of the grantor. Three days later the
grantor died and the deed was not presented for registration until about thirty
days later. The former wife contended that she took as survivor, but the court
held that proceedings under the Torrens Act are governed by rules of equity,
except as otherwise provided; also that although this was a deed of gift, it
operated as a contract to convey, and that the surviving joint tenant's bare
legal title was not an intervening right cutting off the grantee's equitable right
to register the deed.
17O The decision follows the conclusion reached by Washburn, Real Property
(5th ed.), Vol. 1, § 1, par. 11.
171 252 Ill. 194, 96 N.E. 892 (1911).
172 The making of a lease by one joint tenant has been held to work a sever-
ance in England. Roe v. Lonsdale, 12 East 39, 104 Eng. Rep. 16 (1810); Doe v.
Read, 12 East 57, 104 Eng. Rep. 23 (1810).
173 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 76, § 1.
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Donovan174 in construing a deed conveying to "Jennie Dono-
van and the heirs born of her body in fee simple." The court
construed the words "heirs born of her body" as words of
purchase, creating a class gift, rather than words of limita-
tion, creating a fee tail, subject to the Statute of Entails.7 '
The case of Tolley v. Wilson17 in the Supreme Court in-
volved the construction of a will which gave to the son of the
testatrix a life estate in her realty with remainder to his chil-
dren and, in the event that her son should "die without issue,"
remainder over to her "brothers and sisters of the whole
blood and their heirs share and share alike, the children of a
deceased brother or sister . . . taking the share of their de-
ceased parent." The court held that the words, "die without
issue," meant "die without having had issue" and not "die
without issue surviving." An interesting phase of the case is
the court's use, as an aid to the determination of the intent
of the testatrix, of an invalid restriction upon the children's
alienation until they became twenty-five years of age. The
court held that the presence of the restriction impliedly
showed an intent that the children should have power to deal
with the property when they reached the age of twenty-five,
whether or not they survived the life tenant, their father.
Thus the case was brought within the general rule that when
there is an independent gift to the first taker's children, so
that the children receive a vested interest, "without issue"
means "without having had issue.'1
77
That a highway may be established by mere use by the
public as such for fifteen years is established by statute in
Illinois.178 The test as to use is not its volume but its nature,
whether by the general public or by persons interested in the
specific property of which the strip forms a part. In the case
of Stengl v. Starr Brothers79 the Supreme Court again had
occasion to consider this question. One Owens owned two lots
in Carlinville, separated by a twelve-foot public alley running
east and west. In 1919 he conveyed to Starr the tract south
of the alley except the north twelve feet, retaining the north
174 371 IMI. 458, 21 N.E. (2d) 563 (1939). Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 381.
175 IR. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 30, § 5.
176 371 Ill. 124, 20 N.E. (2d) 68 (1939). Note, 34 111. L. Rev. 232.
177 Kales, Estates and Future Interests (2d ed.), §§ 539, 540, 543.
178 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 121, § 152.
179 370 II. 118, 18 N.E. (2d) 179 (1938).
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parcel and the north twelve feet of the south parcel. His title
passed to Mrs. Stengl. Access to the Starr property was had
over the alley and the twelve-foot strip separating the alley
from the Starr lot. The court held, however, that mere travel
across vacant land without objection from the owner would
not suffice to enable the public to acquire a highway over it
and that travel for a special purpose over unoccupied land is
not the character of user required by the statute to establish
a highway by prescription.
In Carter Oil Company v. Myers,180 the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals had before it a deed whereby Brauer and
husband, the grantors, in 1932 conveyed to the People of Fay-
ette County certain strips of land, the language used being,
"grant, convey and dedicate for the purpose of a public high-
way." A road was promptly constructed upon the strips and
gravel taken from them to build and repair highways near by.
In 1936 the Brauers executed an oil and gas lease covering a
tract of 120 acres including the strips conveyed in 1932, and
Carter claims under this lease. In 1937 the county authorities
executed to Myers a similar lease covering part of the strips
purchased and not used by the highway as improved. In 1938
the Brauers made a quit claim deed to the county covering
the land involved in the 1936 lease. When drilling was started
under the Myer lease, Carter filed an action for injunction,
which was granted, this appeal following. The court on ap-
peal held that the deed of 1932 granted an easement only and
did not convey the fee nor the oil and gas thereunder; that the
conveyance to the county in 1936 was ineffective to alter the
rights of Carter under the 1936 lease, that the words "grant
and convey" are not incompatible with the conveyance of a
lesser interest than a fee, and that the county had no interest
to lease to Myers. The court also distinguishes the present
case from the case presented in Carter Oil Company v. Wel-
ker, 8" which it notes is pending on appeal to the same court.
The Illinois statute on Ejectment18 2 provides some small
comfort to the man who is ousted from the property he
bought without actual notice of a superior title, by allowing
to him the value of improvements placed by him on the
180 105 F. (2d) 259 (1939). 181 24 F. Supp. 753 (1938).
182 I1U. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 45, HI 56 et seq.
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land, or if the cost of improvements is more than the value
of the land, to pay the holder of the better title the value of
the land. In the case of Maynard v. Stevens,8 ' a buyer of
land in Section 15 mistakenly built his cabin in Section 22 ad-
joining on the south. Being ejected he sought recompense un-
der the statute, but was denied any relief as he had no claim
of title to the land on which he had erroneously built.
PERSONAL PROPERTY
In Illinois Bell Telephone Company v. Slattery,8 4 the
Circuit Court of Appeals held that telephone subscribers' un-
claimed refunds"5 did not go to the State of Illinois by way of
escheat under the old common law doctrine that the Crown
was entitled to bona vacantia. It was stated by the court that
the common-law doctrine of bona vacantia was too uncertain
and indefinite, as applied to such unclaimed refunds, to be
deemed a rule of law in Illinois, notwithstanding the Illinois
statute which expressly adopted the common law. The court
referred to the case of Middleton v. Spicer,"s6 wherein the
right of the Crown to bona vacantia is defined as a right to
property which has no other owner. It was held that a mere
debtor-creditor relation existed and that after the expiration
of the period fixed by the decree for subscribers to file claims,
the State could not claim the fund since the subscribers had
never been owners of the fund or in any sense in possession
thereof. This case is interesting in that it is an attempt to
have the common-law doctrine of escheat apply to a novel and
unusual factual situation.
In Lindner & Boyden Bank v. Wardrop,187 the Supreme
Court held that where one person deposits money in a bank
and receives a certificate of deposit payable either to him-
self or to another, the title to the fund remains in the depositor,
unless during his life the certificate is delivered to the other
party so as to enable such other party to make withdrawal
183 370 Ill. 594, 19 N.E. (2d) 575 (1939).
184 102 F. (2d) 58 (1939). Note, 34 Il. L. Rev. 171.
185 The "fund" arose as a result of rate litigation, finally terminating in favor
of the subscribers in Lindheimer v. The Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 292 U.S. 151,
54 S. Ct. 658, 78 L. Ed. 1182 (1934). The district court had conditioned the grant-
ing of the original interlocutory injunction upon the giving of a bond by the
telephone company to refund in accordance with the ultimate decision.
186 1 Brown, Ch. 201 (1783).
187 370 M. 310, 18 N.E. (2d) 897 (1938). Note, 27 Ill. B.J. 341.
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in accordance with the terms of the certificate. The Engel-
brecht case, s8 holding parties to be tenants in common un-
der similar circumstances, was distinguished on the ground
that there the circumstances indicated joint contribution to
the fund, whereas here the money appeared to be exclusively
that of the depositor.
CONTRACTS
INSURANCE
A weak attack upon the constitutionality of the Insurance
Code was made in People v. National Bankers Life Insur-
ance Company,"9 wherein the company contended that the
new code'90 was unconstitutional in that it destroyed the
company's franchise rights contrary to the principle an-
nounced in the Dartmouth College case, by expressly repeal-
ing former acts under which the company was originally
organized. The Supreme Court could find no right of the com-
pany which had been affected, and further stated that al-
though the company had been incorporated under a private
act without reservation, still the charter was given subject
to the police power, and due process was satisfied by the re-
quirement in the code that there should be a judicial inquiry
following the Auditor's (Director's) determination of the
facts.
"Riot" coverage as defined in Walter v. Northern In-
surance Company'91 requires that "force and violence" be
present as well as two or more persons doing an unlawful act
against the person or property of another. A building under-
going alteration was stealthily entered and large amounts of
creosote smeared on the walls, ceilings and windows by two
or more persons. The trial court found no riot, the Appellate
Court considered the facts sufficient to constitute a riot, and
the Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court'92 and found
no riot, and no coverage under the term. Resort was had to
the Criminal Code and the common law for definitions and
distinctions.
188 Engelbrecht v. Engelbrecht, 323 Ill. 208, 153 N.E. 827 (1926).
189 369 Ill. 605, 17 N.E. (2d) 579 (1938). 190 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 73, § 800.
191 370 Ill. 283, 18 N.E. (2d) 906 (1939). Note, 28 Ill. B.J. 88.
192 Walter v. Northern Ins. Co., 294 Ill. App. 133, 13 N.E. (2d) 660 (1938).
Note, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 395.
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The Supreme Court recently held1 3 that a railway mu-
tual benefit association, not for profit and paying only total
disability and death benefits, could not be compelled to re-
incorporate under Section 31 of the Corporation Act of 1927,
nor was it amenable to Section 15 of the Mutual Benefit As-
sociations Act since the latter makes no provision to prevent
violation of existing contracts, nor did the association come
within the provisions of the Life Insurance Assessment Act of
1893 as the benefit fund accumulated was a not a reserve
fund. Justice Orr dissented, not without merit, and rather
clearly pointed out that Section 121 of the Insurance Code of
1937 required every company entering into contracts of in-
surance to have a certificate of authority from the State Di-
rector of Insurance. He further stated that since the code
provides for the protection of policies previously written,
there would be no impairment of contracts already in
existence, but that future policies would be subject to the new
contract requirements. Could Justice Orr's conclusion have
been reached it would have resulted in uniformity in the ap-
plication of the code provisions to all associations writing in-
surance contracts, which result the legislature probably de-
sired and intended.
A problem of first impression in Illinois involving cover-
age and ascertainment of damages arose in Mammina v.
Homeland Insurance Companyl9 4 when an automobile truck,
insured against fire, collided with a train. Considerable dam-
age was done to the truck, which thereafter burst into flames
and was consumed. Competent evidence revealed to the satis-
faction of the court that the two causes of loss could be ac-
curately determined by deciding the value of the truck im-
mediately after the impact and the value after the fire. The
losses were thereby segregated and judgment entered along
ordinary rules, without recourse to more arbitrary rules 95
with respect to concurrence of different causes of loss which
might have been applied in the absence of the evidence re-
ferred to.
A case of interest on the facts'9 0 appeared in the third
193 People v. Railway Mail Benefit Ass'n, 371 Ill. 102, 20 N.E. (2d) 91 (1939).
194 371. Ill. 555, 21 N.E. (2d) 727 (1939). 195 Phillips, Insurance, §§ 1136, 1137.
196 American State Bank v. Nat. Life Ins. Co., 297 Ila. App. 137, 17 N.E. (2d)
256 (1938).
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appellate district and was there decided. Edith Neville in her
life time purchased several annuity contracts for which she
paid the total sum of $22,000. She was to receive monthly and
quarterly payments thereafter. She died after receiving ap-
proximately only $1200. A bill filed by her executor claimed
the consideration received under the annuity contracts to be
so grossly inadequate as to "shock the conscience" and to
constitute fraud as a matter of law; further a mutual mistake
of fact as to health and expectancy. The court held that pos-
sibly a medical examination might have revealed her true
physical condition but that there was no duty on the company
to make it, and the assured could have had such examina-
tion had she seen fit. Further, that in the absence of allega-
tions that the decedent was incompetent, or that actual fraud,
misrepresentation, or concealment was practiced on her, or
of any fiduciary relation between the parties, the bill did not
state a cause of action and was therefore properly dismissed.
In Miller v. Central Mutual Insurance Company'97 an
attack upon the chancellor's power to control, direct, or ap-
prove judicially the conduct of the receiver of a delinquent
insurance company appointed by the Director of Insurance
(since the receiver is an administrative and not a judicial
officer) was disposed of by stating that the statute is satis-
fied by the action of the Director of Insurance in appointing
the receiver, and that after decree of insolvency or delin-
quency and liquidation ordered, whatever is thereafter done
is simply in enforcement of the decree and clearly within the
power of the chancellor to approve the receiver's acts.
In construing the terms of a policy covering loss by rob-
bery, which required the robbery to occur in the presence of
a custodian of the property, the Appellate Court of the Second
District l9 s held that, where a closed door and a brick wall
separated the thief and the custodian, who was unaware of
the theft until the door was opened and the thief was in flight
125 feet away, such robbery did not occur within the policy
coverage. The court stated that no Illinois case had been call-
ed to its attention where "presence," as used in an insurance
197 299 Ill. App. 194, 19 N.E. (2d) 822 (1939).
198 Grimes v. The Maryland Casualty Co., 300 Ill. App. 62, 20 N.E. (2d) 982
(1939).
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policy like that under the facts of the case, had been defined,
and therefore the court drew and applied the analogy of the
Illinois cases regarding "in the testator's presence" in the
attestation of wills.
Increasing use of the procedure of declaratory judg-
ments1 99 for determining insurance problems, and the pos-
sible avoidance of jury trials, is indicated by several cases in
the federal courts of which the instant case is typical. A
plaintiff insurer 0 sought a declaration that it had been re-
lieved of liability under the indemnity insurance contract by
reason of the violation of certain conditions therein by the
defendant automobile owner insured. The specific risk ex-
cluded was in "respect of injuries caused in whole or in-
part.., while operated... by any person violating regula-
tions governing the licensing of motor vehicle operators, or
when driven by any person whose right to drive has been
enjoined by proper authority or whose right to drive has been
suspended or revoked." The Illinois law required the chauf-
feur to be registered and licensed. 20 1 That the chauffeur
was not licensed was admitted. The district stated its con-
clusions of law favorable to the plaintiff insurer and the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decree. No doubt greater
use will be made by many insurers when the advantage is
seen and the facts warrant the procedure.
SALES
Where a conditional sales vendor incorporated in the con-
tract a provision more likely to be found in a trust receipt:
"That the proceeds of all resales shall be considered the
property of the company in lieu of the goods so sold and
held in trust for it . . . ," the conditional vendor claimed that
this provision was good not only as to the conditional vendee
but also as to a judgment creditor of the conditional
vendee. 20 2 The proceeds of the resale by the conditional
vendee were deposited by him in his bank account together
199 28 U.S.C.A. § 400.
200 Universal Indemnity Ins. Co. v. North Shore Delivery Co., 100 F. (2d) 618
(1938).
201 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 95 , § 33.
202 Kilgore v. The State Bank of Colusa, 300 Ill. App. 409, 21 N.E. (2d) 9
(1939).
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with his personal funds. A judgment creditor sought to reach
the funds by garnishment and the conditional vendor was
permitted to intervene, but the Appellate Court affirmed a
judgment for the judgment creditor, saying, "To hold that a
valid trust exists under the contract and circumstances in
this case would invade a wholly new field for the law." In
view of the recent adoption of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act in Illinois, the issue might be raised as to whether, had
the case arisen after the adoption of that act, the conditional
vendor's right could be recognized on the theory of a trust
receipt. Assuming that it could be so classified, the en-
truster's right would be as provided for in Section 10 of that
act. By Section 10 (a) it is contemplated that the proceeds
be still in the hands of the sub-vendee, whereas here the
funds had been turned over to the conditional vendee ("trus-
tee"). Section 10 (b) comes nearest to applying, because
under that section the proceeds need not be identified, but
the prerequisites of that section" 3 did not appear in the facts
of this case. Section 10 (c) requires identifiable funds. Hence
it appears that, even if the contract had been intended to be
a trust receipt transaction, the judgment creditor would have
prevailed.
GUARANTY AND SURETYSHIP
The Appellate Court, in the case of People v. Marx,
2 0 4
was called upon to determine whether, under the Civil Prac-
tice Act, a surety who was sued with his principal by the ob-
203 III. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 121%, § 175: "Where, under the terms of the
trust receipt transaction, the trustee has no liberty of sale or other disposition,
or, having liberty of sale or other disposition, is to account to the entruster for
the proceeds of any disposition of the goods, documents or instruments, the
entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as against all classes of
persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time of disposition by
the trustee, as follows:
"(a) To the debts described in subsection three of section nine hereof; and
also
"(b) To any proceeds or the value of any proceeds (whether such proceeds are
identifiable or not) of the goods, documents or instruments, if said proceeds were
received by the trustee within ten days prior to either application for appoint-
ment of a receiver of the trustee, or the filing of a petition in bankruptcy or
judicial insolvency proceedings by or against the trustee, or demand made by
the entruster for prompt accounting; and to a priority to the amount of such
proceeds or value; and also
"(c) To any other proceeds of the goods, documents or instruments which are
identifiable."
204 299 Ill. App. 284, 20 N.E. (2d) 103 (1939).
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ligee on the bond, could in the same action file a counter-
claim to recover from his principal. It was held that the
surety could file such counterclaim subsequent to the answer
if the court in its discretion thought proper, since to hold
otherwise would be to give the act a narrow and restricted
construction.
An agreement by a bank with a purchaser therefrom of
certain assessment bonds was held to be unenforceable in
People v. Rockford Trust Company.0 5 The purchaser of the
bonds, as intervening petitioner in liquidation proceedings,
sought to be allowed to return the bonds and prayed that
the bank or receiver for the bank be compelled to pay him
the purchase price therefor, it being alleged by petitioner
that the bonds were purchased with the agreement and under-
standing that they could be returned and exchanged for first
mortgages. Relief was denied, the court holding that such
was in effect a guarantee to repurchase securities sold and
was therefore prohibited by statute,00 which declares it to be
unlawful for a bank or similar institution having savings de-
posits of trust funds to guarantee payment of any debt,
which payment, if made, would jeopardize or impair the se-
curity of such deposits.
QUASI-CONTRACTS
Whether gifts made in contemplation of marriage may be
recovered upon the death of the donee, was the question pre-
sented to the court in Urbanas v. Burns,0 7 and answered in
the negative. The court conceded that a right to specific
restitution of such gifts might be permitted where the donee
wilfully breached the contract to marry, but denied that the
right to recover exists where the marriage fails to take
place through no fault of the donee. Restitution in specie for
fraud or wilful breach by the donee would be allowed only,
the court emphasized, in the case of gifts "intimately con-
nected with the marriage," such as rings and heirlooms. The
only other Illinois case discovered on this precise point was
Rockafellow v. Newcomb, °8 in which recovery of land con-
205 296 IRl. App. 582, 16 N.E. (2d) 822 (1938).
206 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 64.
207 300 IRl. App. 207, 20 N.E. (2d) 869 (1939).
208 57 Ill. 186 (1870).
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veyed by the plaintiff to his fianc6e in contemplation of mar-
riage was allowed upon the wilful refusal of the donee to
marry the plaintiff. The Restatement of Restitution 091 sug-
gests that gifts may be made conditional upon the marriage
of the donor and donee but that this is not ordinarily the case
except perhaps where the gifts are of considerable size or
carry an intent of sole or primary use after marriage, such
as land, furniture, and bank accounts. Under the Code Napo-
leon, literally copied into the Louisiana Civil Code, "every
donation made in favor of marriage falls if the marriage
does not take place." 210  The effect of this provision is to
make such gifts void if marriage, the ultimate purpose of the
gifts, does not occur.
In Kippen v. Kippen,211 the plaintiff, a sister of the de-
fendant, was given a judgment for the reasonable value of
services rendered in supporting the defendant's three minor
children in her home for a period of several years. Although
the defendant and his children had lived for several years
after the death of the children's mother in the same house-
hold with the plaintiff, the court held that no presumption
arose that the services were rendered gratuitously as the
prompting of affection. The law will imply a promise by one
to reimburse another for expenditures in discharging the for-
mer's duty to support minor children, the court declared.
The problems involved in determining the right to recover
for services rendered in behalf of another without request
were hardly touched upon by the opinion, and practically
nothing seems to have been decided in Illinois on this
point.212
MISCELLANEOUS
Where banks had, contrary to public policy, pledged as-
sets to secure deposits, two Illinois Appellate cases 213 held
that there was a conversion as of the time of the deposit so
209 § 58, comment C.
21o Wardlaw v. Conrad, 18 La. App. 387, 137 So. 603 (1931).
211 301 Ill. App. 178, 21 N.E. (2d) 906 (1939).
212 Ordinarily where necessaries are furnished there is a presumption that
payment is intended, but proof of a sufficiently close blood or family relationship
will either rebut this presumption or raise a presumption that the plaintiff in-
tended to render the services gratuitously. 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 873.
213 Albers v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 296 IM. App. 592, 17 N.E. (2d) 66
(1938) and 296 Ill. App. 596, 17 N.E. (2d) 67 (1938).
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that the statute of limitations on cause of action for recovery
thereof would begin to run as of that time even though n6
demand were made therefor until some time later. In a fed-
eral court case for the seventh circuit,21 4 where the court
was called upon to determine from what time interest would
accrue on such an illegal deposit, it was said, "Here the
money was voluntarily paid to the city and, though this was
improper under the law, it seems to us, in view of the honest
belief of the comptroller, the receiver and the bank to the
contrary, it cannot be that it was illegally withheld until de-
mand was made for repayment." In view of the fact that
the pledged securities were not regarded by the parties as
held by the pledgee adversely before default in payment of
the deposit or at least before discovery of the illegality,2 15
the conversion should be regarded as having taken place no
sooner. The time of conversion would be the time from
which both limitation on action and interest should run.
A new ground of discharge of a contract by impossibility
was added in O'Hern v. De Long216 when the court said that
dissolution of an insurance company by order of the insur-
ance director excused the company from its executory obli-
gation to pay renewal commissions to an insurance agent.
The impossibility was not in the company's ability to pay the
commissions but in the ability to receive premiums on which
the payment of commissions depended. When a condition
precedent becomes impossible it is not usually excused and
so on its failure to occur no liability arises. But an exception
exists where the promisor himself makes the condition im-
possible. In other cases insolvency has been treated as a
status which in point of law has been self-imposed.217 In this
view, a defense of failure of a condition would be untenable.
The present case may, therefore, presage either a distinc-
214 La Parr v. The City of Rockford, 100 F. (2d) 564 (1938).
215 Such agreements were not held to be illegal until the deposits mentioned in
the Illinois Appellate Court cases, supra, were made. Sneeden v. The City of
Marion, 64 F. (2d) 721 (1933), affirmed in City of Marion v. Sneeden, 291 U.S. 262,
54 S. Ct. 421, 78 L. Ed. 787 (1934). People v. Wiersema State Bank, 361 Ill. 75,
197 N.E. 537 (1935).
216 298 Ill. App. 375, 19 N.E. (2d) 214 (1939).
217 See Western Drug Supply & Specialty Co. v. Board of Administration of
Kansas, 106 Kan. 256, 187 P. 701, 12 A.L.R. 1074 (1920); 17 CHicAco-KENT LAW RE-
vuw 279.
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tion between voluntary and involuntary dissolution or an
abandonment of the view that a dissolution based on insolv-
ency is legally self-induced.
TORTS
The decision of the Appellate Court, reported in last
year's survey, holding the city of Chicago liable for injuries
received by a person as a result of a fall upon an ice covered
safety island, was reversed by the Supreme Court in Strap-
pelli v. City of Chicago.218 The Supreme Court was not con-
vinced that the development of uneven ridges of ice on the
island due to thawing and freezing imposed upon the city any
greater degree of care than it was required to exercise else-
where in the safeguarding of streets and sidewalks from dan-
gerous hazards.
In Bryan v. City of Chicago,219 the court upheld the con-
stitutionality bf a statute20 authorizing recovery against
municipalities for the negligent operation of fire trucks. The
approving opinion cites a number of decisions in other juris-
dictions reaching the same conclusion with reference to the
validity of legislative efforts to extend the liability imposed
upon municipalities for torts committed in the field of govern-
mental activities.
The immunity of park districts from liability in tort was
reaffirmed in the case of Le Pitre v. Chicago Park Dis-
trict,221 involving a claim for personal injuries arising out of
a collision between a car and an unlighted light post on a
park boulevard. Park districts are created solely to perform
governmental functions, the court said, and enjoy the same
immunity from liability in tort as cities and villages in the
maintenance of parks. Costello v. City of Aurora,222 discuss-
ed in last year's survey, holding a city liable for personal in-
juries arising out of the negligent maintenance of a park, was
not the law, the court declared.228
218 371 IM. 72, 20 N.E. (2d) 43 (1939).
219 371 Ill. 64, 20 N.E. (2d) 37 (1939).
220 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, § 9.
221 299 Ill. App. 263, 20 N.E. (2d) 111 (1939). Note, 33 IML L. Rev. 974.
222 295 Ill. App. 510, 15 N.E. (2d) 38 (1938).
223 For citations in this field indicating that the Costello case is not in accord
with Supreme Court decisions in this state, see 17 Cm-cAo-KENT LAW REvw 50.
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The statutory requirement 24 that notice must be given
to city or village officials within six months after an accident
which forms the basis for a suit against such city or village,
is not complied with by a notice which gave the place of ac-
cident one-quarter of a mile from the correct scene, the court
held in Keller v. Tomaska.225 The notice must be sufficient-
ly accurate, the court declared, to enable the city or village
authorities, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, to locate
the scene of the accident. The court referred to the holding
in Ouimette v. City of Chicago,28 to the effect that the suf-
ficiency of a notice as a prerequisite to the maintenance of
a personal injury suit against a city is to be determined by
the notice itself, and one giving a defective notice is not aid-
ed by the fact that the city may have received accurate
knowledge of the location of the accident from other sources.
In Parker v. Kirkland227 we have an interesting problem
in the extent of privilege in defamation. In the course of a
proceeding before the Cook County Board of Tax Appeals,
brought by a former employee of the Tribune Company for
the purpose of effecting assessment of capital stock tax of
that company for the years 1872 to 1934 as omitted prop-
erty,228 the defendant, counsel for the company, character-
ized the plaintiff as "just a contemptible falsifier" and "con-
temptible blackmailer," and stated that "his sole purpose is
of blackmailing the Chicago Tribune Company." The Appel-
late Court held the statements privileged, as being pertinent
to the inquiry. The further remarks, "he is a rat" or "a
dirty rat" and that "he ought to be taken for a ride," while
characterized by the court as "ill chosen and harsh," were
not justified as pertinent and privileged, but were held not
to constitute actionable slander as not being defamatory per
se. The decision contains an excellent discussion of the na-
ture of the Board of Tax Appeals, with the ultimate conclu-
sion that it is a quasi-judicial body, and hence that proceed-
ings before it are privileged.
In Francis v. Humphrey229 the District Court for the
224 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 70, § 7.
225 299 IM. App. 34, 19 N.E. (2d) 442 (1939).
226 148 Ill. App. 505 (1909). 227 298 Ill. App. 340, 18 N.E. (2d) 709 (1939).
228 See 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REvIEw 63.
229 25 F. Supp. 1 (1938).
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Eastern District of Illinois solved a challenging problem of
substance and procedure and the application of the new Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion was sustained to
dismiss a personal injury complaint which failed to allege
freedom from contributory negligence as required under Illi-
nois law.230 The plaintiff contended that Rule 8 (c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure makes contributory negli-
gence an affirmative defense, and so relieves him of the bur-
den of alleging freedom therefrom. 231  The court held that
the matter was one of "substance," and that in any case
where the Rules abridge or modify substantive rights given
under state law, they are to that extent void, in accordance
with Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.32
In Smith v. Luckhardt,233 the Appellate Court has fol-
lowed the well-settled law of Illinois,234 that an action cannot
be maintained by a living child for pre-natal injuries, nor by
the administratrix of such child after its death. The case is
interesting because of the frank challenge to the court to
change the law, and the appearance of two well reasoned
comments on the case supporting that challenge.233
Although the Illinois courts have handed down numerous
other decisions containing clear and informative statements
236libltfo
concerning absence of degrees of negligence, liability for
vicious animals,237 attractive nuisance,238 municipal liabil-
230 See Urban v. Pere Marquette R. Co., 266 Ill. App. 152 (1930).
231 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8:
"(c) Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assump-
tion of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel,
failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license,
payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver,
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. When a
party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim
as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading
as if there had been a proper designation."
232 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487 (1938). See note
on the principal case, 27 Georgetown L.J. 375; also a comment on the general
problem in 37 Mich. L. Rev. 1249.
233 299 Ill. App. 100, 19 N.E. (2d) 446 (1939).
234 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
235 27 Ill. B. J. 348; 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1016.
236 Schmidt v. Anderson, 301 Ill. App. 28, 21 N.E. (2d) 825 (1939).
237 Happke v. Huston, 301 Ill. App. 191, 22 N.E. (2d) 124 (1939).
238 Cicero State Bank v. Dolese & Shephard Co., 298 Ill. App. 290, 18 N.E. (2d)
574 (1939).
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ity,21 9 false arrest,240  malicious prosecution, 241 fraud and
deceit,242  and res ipsa loquitur,2 43  such expressions are
merely cumulative of earlier decisions and so not deemed
worthy of further particular mention.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
The legislature added to the list of prohibited acts by
placing five new offenses on the criminal calendar: (a) The
possession of the seeds of certain noxious weeds with intent
to disseminate the same is punishable;244 (b) the manufac-
ture, possession, storage, transportation, sale, or gift of ex-
plosives is subjected to extensive regulation; 245 (c) it is crim-
inal to trespass on the land of another, whether enclosed or
not, after permission to enter has been denied, or a request
to depart has been made;246 (d) the scope of the act regul-
lating the manufacture and possession of narcotic drugs-to
overcome the effect of the decision in People v. Sowrd 4 -
has been enlarged to include the possession of all parts of
the marijuana plant; 248 and (e) a new act relating to the
obstruction of navigable waters by watercraft, with criminal
penalties, has been adopted.249
At the same time the courts were also engaged in clarify-
ing the criminal law of the state. It has now become estab-
lished that one who fills up a signed blank check in an un-
authorized fashion is guilty of the crime of forgery just as
well as one who alters an existing instrument.250  Likewise,
239 Koch v. City of Chicago, 297 Ill. App. 103, 17 N.E. (2d) 365 (1938); Kellems
v. Schiele, 297 Ill. App. 388, 17 N.E. (2d) 604 (1938).
240 People v. Euctice, 371 Il. 159, 20 N.E. (2d) 83 (1939).
241 Sheffield v. Cantwell, 101 F. (2d) 351 (1939).
242 People v. Central Republic Trust Co., 300 M1l. App. 297, 20 N.E. (2d) 999 (1939).
243 Styburski v. Riverview Park Co., 298 Ill. App. 1, 18 N.E. (2d) 92 (1938);
Smith v. Illinois Power & Light Co., 297 Ill. App. 358, 17 N.E. (2d) 632 (1938).
244 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 89, as amended by Laws 1939, p. 501.
245 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 93, § 143-156, added by Laws 1939, p. 508, repealing
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 38, § 229-235, which carried more severe penalties.
246 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 565, as amended by Laws 1939, p. 514. The
request may be made orally or by posting signs.
247 370 Ill. 140, 18 N.E. (2d) 176 (1938), reversing 295 Ill. App. 314, 14 N.E. (2d)
957 (1938). Note, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 1325.
248 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 192.1-192.28, as amended by Laws 1939, p. 498.
249 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 19, §§ 47a-47e, added by Laws 1939, p. 515.
250 People v. Kubanek, 370 Ill. 646, 19 N.E. (2d) 573 (1939), in which the court
refused to follow People v. Kramer, 352 Ill. 304, 185 N.E. 590 (1933).
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a valid conviction of conspiracy must depend on the convic-
tion of not less than two persons, so that if only one defend-
ant has been tried and found guilty, sentence of such person
must await the outcome of the trial of the other alleged of-
fender.25' So, too, a public official may be prosecuted for
failure to turn over the funds of his office only if the demand
therefor is made by the person legally entitled thereto, who
may or may not be his successor in office.252 Of similar in-
terest is the decision in United States v. About 151.682 Acres
of Land53 which limits the power of the government, in for-
feiture proceedings, to the seizure of only those premises
actually used in the illegal enterprise, which may or may
not be coextensive with the natural boundaries thereof.
Other scattered problems in the field of criminal pro-
cedure have also received consideration, either legislative or
judicial. Thus an indictment for malicious mischief must be
endorsed to show the name of the prosecutor,2 54 but this
statutory requirement was deemed satisfied in People v.
Novotny255 by the presence of the name of a prosecutor,
even though such person was not the owner of the property
damaged. The time within which prosecution of public of-
ficials for embezzlement of public funds may be commenced
has been extended by omitting the period of the term of of-
fice from the statutory period of limitation.26  The action of
the Appellate Court in reversing a decision for the defendant
on a motion to quash an indictment will hereafter require the
defendant to stand trial on the indictment before he can
secure a ruling on such action by the Supreme Court.
2 5
1
251 People v. Levy, 299 Ill. App. 453, 20 N.E. (2d) 171 (1939), in which the judg-
ment was reversed, despite the court's satisfaction as to the defendant's guilt, be-
cause the record failed to show the outcome of the trial of a codefendant to whom
a severance had been granted, on the ground that without the conviction of the
latter, the crime of conspiracy would be a legal impossibility.
252 People v. Jochums, 369 Ill. 348, 16 N.E. (2d) 894 (1938). Conviction of clerk
of circuit court reversed because demand made by successor in office, when it
should have been made by county treasurer. People v. Anderson, 342 Ill. 290, 174
N.E. 391 (1931), distinguished on facts. Language of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38,
1 460, qualified.
253 99 F. (2d) 716 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938). See note in 17 CHIcAGo-KENT LAw REviEw 185.
254 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 717.
255 371 Ill. 58, 20 N.E. (2d) 34 (1939).
256 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 632a, added by Laws 1939, p. 507.
257 People v. McArdle, 370 Ill. 513, 19 N.E. (2d) 328 (1939), dismissing writ of
error on ground of lack of jurisdiction because no "final order" disposing of the
rights of the parties was involved.
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Power to grant probation to persons convicted of forcible
rape is hereafter denied the trial court.2 58 Male juvenile of-
fenders up to the age of nineteen years may, in the discretion
of the trial court, be confined in the Illinois State Training
School for Boys instead of the penitentiary. 59 The treat-
ment of convicted persons who subsequently become insane
is now to be handled differently in cases where the punish-
ment is imprisonment in places other than the penitentiary
or reformatory. The offender, upon restoration of sanity, is
now to be discharged if the original period of the sentence
has expired.2 60 The handling of the cases of penitentiary in-
mates who become insane subsequent to sentence and com-
mitment is continued as heretofore.26'
The chances of a convicted offender securing discharge
on habeas corpus proceedings seem lessened by the action
taken in two significant cases. In People v. Circuit Court of
Will County2 2 it was emphatically announced that such re-
lief cannot be granted where the conviction has been review-
ed and affirmed on writ of error, and that while the several
courts of the state possess concurrent original jurisdiction in
habeas corpus proceedings this is not true after appellate jur-
isdiction of the case has been assumed by higher tribunals.
The use of the writ of habeas corpus in lieu of a writ of error
was likewise condemned in People v. Hunter2 63 in which
case, through mistake, a defendant had been convicted of
robbery "as charged in the second count in the indictment,"
whereas, in fact, there was only one count. It was held that
the writ would not lie where the trial court had jurisdiction
of the subject matter and the person of the defendant, since
in such case its judgment at worst would be voidable only and
not void, preventing any collateral attack thereon.
258 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 785, as amended by Laws 1939, p. 502.
259 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 803, as amended by Laws 1939, p. 496. The
earlier statute had fixed the age limit at sixteen.
260 IlM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 86, § 47, 48, added without Governor's approval,
Laws 1939, p. 703.
261 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 38, § 593, and Ch. 108, § 113.
262 369 IIl. 438, 17 N.E. (2d) 46 (1938).
263 369 Ill. 427, 17 N.E. (2d) 29 (1938). See also United States v. Ragen, 102 F.
(2d) 184 (1939), in which relief was sought from a conviction in the Illinois state
court on a two-count indictment, the second count of which had been stricken,
and the proceedings resulted in an erroneous judgment on the stricken count
when it should have been on count one. Held, writ of habeas corpus denied.
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REMEDIES
EQUITY
The First District Appellate Court held recently that sen-
iority rights of railroad employees were property rights en-
forceable in a court of equity.264 The opinion of Mr. Justice
Matchett reviewed the conflicting authorities in other states
and noted that the case was one of first impression in Illinois.
Where interests and rights have come to have sufficient def-
inition to be afforded legal recognition, courts of equity tend
to be less restrictive in the use of the term "property right."
It was pointed out years ago that a property right in any
technical and restricted sense of the term was not essential
to the existence of equitable jurisdiction in spite of frequent
expressions by courts and text writers to the contrary.
26 5
Employment of a technique of stamping new rights with the
"property-right" seal of approval has resulted in an expand-
ed sphere of equitable protection. It may be queried whether
the time has not come to abandon this technique in favor of
an exposition of the problems and policies which always
underly the question of extending equitable relief. Rights hav-
ing positive pecuniary value have come to be included within
the meaning now assigned to the term "property right." In
the Ledford case, the court was justified in looking upon sen-
iority rights as "property rights" in this sense.
The doctrine of election of inconsistent remedies was
examined by the Supreme Court in the case of Fleming v.
Dillon.266 In a suit for specific performance of an oral con-
tract to devise real and personal property in return for care
and services, it was urged that the plaintiff must fail because
she had filed a claim for the value of her services against
the estate of the promissor. The court held that the remedies
were coexistent. Since the plaintiff had not received satis-
faction, there was no prejudice to the defendant heirs in al-
lowing the suit for specific performance. This holding seems
a just one in view of the fact that equity requires clear and
264 Ledford v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 298 IMI. App. 298, 18 N.E. (2d)
568 (1939). Note, 27 Ill. B. J. 307.
265 R. Pound, "Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Personali-
ty," 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640; J. R. Long, "Equitable Jurisdiction to Protect Personal
Rights," 33 Yale L. J. 115.
266 370 Ill. 325, 18 N.E. (2d) 910 (1939).
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convincing proof of the existence of such contracts before
specific performance will be granted. It is sometimes true
that meritorious claims do not succeed because of the dif-
ficulties of proof that are inherent in such transactions. Such
a claimant would be greatly prejudiced by being forced to
elect whether to file a claim against the estate or to sue for
specific enforcement of the promise.
The problem of the degree of certainty required for the
equitable enforcement of a contract was considered in an in-
teresting opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of
Hazeltine Corporation v. Zenith Radio Corporation.267 In a
patent infringement suit, the defendant claimed to be equit-
ably licensed to manufacture under the patent by virtue of a
contract whereby the plaintiff agreed to renew the defend-
ant's existing license by executing a new standard form of
license which had not then been adopted. It was agreed that
the defendant should receive the lowest rate of royalty grant-
ed to any other licensee. The plaintiff thereafter adopted a
new standard form of agreement. The court held that the
agreement was sufficiently certain to be enforcible. As a
general rule, where essential terms of a contract are left to
be determined by the will or choice of one of the parties, a
court of equity cannot grant specific performance. But
where that choice is exercised, the resulting terms become a
part of the contract and the uncertainty is removed. 68
The Appellate Court for the First District held that Sec-
tion 72 of the Civil Practice Act,269 abolishing the writ
of error coram nobis and substituting a proceeding by mo-
tion, applied to equity cases.- Previous cases had not posi-
tively determined the question. 27' This case suggested but
did not settle the problem of the relation between law and
equity under the Illinois Act.272
EVIDENCE
Two significant cases in the field of search and seizure
267 100 F. (2d) 10 (C.C.A. 7th, 1938).
268 See note in 23 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1939).
269 111. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 196.
270 Frank v. Newburger, 298 Ill. App. 548, 19 N.E. (2d) 147 (1939).
271 Maniatis v. Carelin, 287 Ill. App. 154, 4 N.E. (2d) 654 (1936). See note, 17
CHICAGo-KENT LAW REvIEw 276.
272 See comment in 27 Ill. B. J. 284, and letter of Mr. Justice O'Connor, 27 IM.
B. J. 313.
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were decided during the year. People v. Lind273 required the
Supreme Court of Illinois to determine for the first time
whether a wife is able to waive her husband's constitutional
immunity against search of his dwelling. The husband at the
time was in jail and police officers without a search warrant
came to the premises to search for stolen property. After
obtaining consent from the wife under such circumstances
that it cannot be said that the consent was freely given, the
police officers searched the premises and found incriminating
evidence. A failure of the trial court to suppress the evidence
on motion made resulted, after conviction, in the case being
reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court reviewed the
authorities on the question involved and the facts, and find-
ing no precedent in Illinois, followed the decisions of the
majority of other jurisdictions .274
In People v. Dent,275 the court applied the rule to third
parties in general, holding that the invitation of another than
the owner for officers to enter premises without a search
warrant must be extended under specific authorization. It
was papers used in the "policy game" which were here
seized, papers which were on a table in plain view of the de-
fendant, and the invitation to enter was given in the presence
of the defendant. Although no trick or deception was actu-
ally used, the court seemed to feel that the consent, even if
imputable to the owner, was "fraudulent," and the entrance
illegal. It is perhaps not surprising that three justices dis-
sented vigorously.
Until the present year, Illinois, practically alone of all
the states, has required the proof of the commission of a
felony beyond a reasonable doubt in a civil suit where the
crime alleged constitutes the cause of action or the defense.
Until 1925 the rule included misdemeanors, but by Rost v.
Noble & Company276 the reasonable doubt rule was confined
to felonies. Now, by Sundquist v. Hardware Mutual Insurance
Company, 77 the reasonable doubt rule has been consigned
to limbo in civil cases and a preponderance of the evidence
273 370 IM. 131, 18 N.E. (2d) 189 (1938). Note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 503.
274 The court relied particularly upon State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.
(2d) 490 (1936).
275 371 IIl. 33, 19 N.E. (2d) 1020 (1939).
276 316 Ill. 357, 147 N.E. 258 (1925).
277 371 Mi1. 360, 21 N.E. (2d) 297. Note, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVEW 371.
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will suffice. The opinion cites the authorities at considerable
length and states that in England the rule arose no doubt
because in that country when a finding of guilt of crime oc-
curred in a civil suit a prosecution could immediately follow
without the intervention of a grand jury. Since the reason
for the original English rule was never applicable in this
state, and since our Supreme Court feels it to be doubtful if
the rule is still in force in England, it seems high time to
pry out this mossy obstruction to civil justice.
Of less importance, but interesting because the situation
is a rarity, is the case of Bezouskas v. Kruger,278 involving
reputation for care in the absence of eye witnesses. Evi-
dence as to the deceased's habits of using care when cross-
ing streets was stricken from the record in the trial of a cause
for wrongful death, since there was no evidence whatever of
any negligence on the part of the defendant, and the evi-
dence offered of careful habits on the part of the deceased
would have been useless in the case. The Appellate Court
based its decision on the holding in Casey v. Chicago Rail-
ways Company.279
CIVIL PRACTICE
Action by the legislature and by the courts, under the
rule-making power 280 as well as by decision, has produced
several innovations in the realm of pleading and procedure.
Thus the troublesome problem of acquiring jurisdiction over
a party whose whereabouts are unknown and whose very
existence is even in doubt has been remedied by permitting
service by publication as though he were dead, leaving -un-
known heirs to represent him.281 Venue in divorce cases
has been noted elsewhere,8 2 but of like interest is a change
permitting confession of judgment in "any country in which
is located any property, real or personal, owned by any one
278 298 Ill. App. 462, 19 N.E. (2d) 116 (1939).
279 269 Ill. 386, 109 N.E. 384 (1915).
280 The amended rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois, effective as of August
1, 1938, may be found in 370 Ill. 13. The revised procedure for the district courts
of the United States is also in operation. Extensive comment thereon having
already appeared, further comment is unnecessary.
281 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 153 (Civil Practice Act, § 29) as amended by
Laws 1939, p. 832.
282 See note 80, supra.
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or more of the defendants."' ' The old concept that no in-
fant may be bound by judgment unless represented by a
guardian ad litem seems to have yielded slightly so that now
the defect may not be availed of without a showing that some
injustice has been done by the failure to appoint such guard-
ian ad litem, though the wise practitioner will still doubtless
secure the appointment of proper representation for infant
parties.284
The pleading sections of the Civil Practice Act appear to
be well understood by the bar, but the use and function of the
counterclaim has produced some problems. Section 38 of the
act provides that "the counterclaim shall be a part of the
answer .. .,"285 and seems to intimate that the two, answer
and counterclaim, should be filed simultaneously. This sec-
tion, however, has been construed in People v. Marx286 to
allow the filing of a counterclaim at any time prior to judg-
ment in the original proceeding. The fundamental proposi-
tion that an answer will not suffice to secure affirmative
relief, making the use of the counterclaim essential, is reiter-
ated in Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Herlin,28 7 ap-
parently the first such decision under this point, where the
court followed the older practice regarding the use of cross-
bills in equity. The function of a reply, especially to over-
come the defense of release, is well illustrated in Roggen-
kamp v. Marks, 28 as well as the necessity for the return, or
at least tender of, the amount received for the release.
The provision for two motions to dismiss has also pro-
duced some confusion. The motion under Section 45 of the
283 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 174(5) (Civil Practice Act, § 50) as amended
by Laws 1939, p. 830. Hitherto venue in such cases was confined to counties (a)
in which the obligation sued on was executed, or (b) where one or more of the
defendants resided. See Ill. Rev. Stat 1937, Ch. 110, § 174, the provisions of which
continue in the amended act.
284 Zielinski v. Pleason, 299 Ill. App. 594, 20 N.E. (2d) 620 (1939). Note, 17
CHICAGo-KENT LAw REVIEw 383.
285 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 162.
286 299 Ill. App. 284, 20 N.E. (2d) 103 (1939). The case also discloses the view
that the surety when sued with the principal may present a conditional counter-
claim for indemnity in case judgment in the original action should run against
the surety and he be compelled to satisfy the same. Heretofore a separate
action would have been necessary unless the suit proceeded in equity.
287 299 Ill. App. 429, 20 N.E. (2d) 333 (1939).
288 299 ]M. App. 209, 19 N.E. (2d) 828 (1939). See comment thereon in 17
CHCAGO-KENT LAW REVEW 275, and on same problem in 17 CHIcAGo-KENT Law
RE-zw 93.
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Civil Practice Act 2 9 operates like the old common law gen-
eral demurrer in many respects. Action on one such mo-
tion, however, does not seem to preclude the presentation of
a similar motion, especially if the decision in the first in-
stance produced a mere interlocutory order. 290  The other
motion under Section 48291 is analogous to the common law
"speaking" demurrer and may supply necessary information
not already in the pleading record. Where such extraneous
matter is to be introduced the pleader must be sure to at-
tach an affidavit verifying the truth thereof. Failure so to do
will lead to denial of the motion.292 When such motion is
properly presented, plaintiff may file counter-affidavits, and
if the issue thus presented is one of fact, and the action is
one at law and a jury trial has been demanded, the court
must summarily deny the motion. Any rule of court which
attempts to give the court power to pass upon the motion in
such a case would be unconstitutional,29 3 and there can be no
interim jury trial to determine the disputed point in advance
of the regular trial on the issues made by complaint and an-
swer.
294
Enforcement of judgments has been both aided and
hampered. Statutory enactment now authorizes the sale of
real estate free from the inchoate right of dower in the spouse
of the married owner, whose right is now shifted to the pro-
ceeds of sale and is to be satisfied therefrom. 295  A change
in the manner of securing execution against the person in
289 Im. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 169.
290 Municipal Employees Ins. Association v. Taylor, 300 Ill. App. 231, 20 N.E.
(2d) 835 (1939), was an action in equity for rescission. Defendant's first motion
to dismiss was denied and defendant was ordered to plead over. Instead of so
doing, defendant filed a second motion to dismiss and this, though filed without
leave of court, was sustained and plaintiff's action was dismissed for want of
equity. Held: defendant might, in court's discretion, be allowed to present a
subsequent motion even though it rested, apparently, on the same grounds.
291 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 172.
292 Budlong v. Los Angeles Bible Institute, 296 Ill. App. 552, 16 N.E. (2d) 810
(1939). Note, 27 Ill. B.J. 209.
293 Diversey Liquidating Corp. v. Neunkirchen, 370 Ill. 523, 19 N.E. (2d) 363,
120 A.L.R. 1395 (1939), holding paragraph 3 of Rule 111 of the Municipal Court of
Chicago void as an unconstitutional attempt to deprive a party of his right to
trial by jury.
294 Fitzpatrick v. Pitcairn, 371 Ill. 203, 20 N.E. (2d) 280 (1939). Note, 17
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 372.
295 mII. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 14a, added by Laws 1939, p. 690, filed vithout
governor's approval July 25, 1939. The rights of creditors superior to the in-
choate right of dower are not affected.
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cases involving malice was noted in Miles v. Glad.28  Re-
vival of judgments may now be secured by affidavit in the
fashion suggested by an amendment to the Limitations
Act.297 A motion in the nature of the writ of error coram
nobis may now be secured both at law and in equity.
298
The problem of securing appellate review still engages
attention. It is now settled that Rule 34 of the Illinois Su-
preme Court does not require service of notice of appeal on
defaulted parties, first by decision of the Supreme Court,2 99
and subsequently, by amendment of the Rule itself." Where
required, the service upon counsel of the notice of appeal may
occur either before or after the filing of the original notice in
the trial court so long as it occurs within the five-day pe-
riod." Such notice of appeal is jurisdictional, however, and
must appear in the record transmitted to the appellate court
within the appeal period. If it does not, and no additional
record is filed to correct such omission, the appeal will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 2  Relief from such seem-
ingly arbitrary action may, however, be indicated by the
decision in Melsha v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation,"9 3
where, though the appeal had been dismissed for failure to
file a transcript of record in apt time, an appeal was never-
theless allowed under Section 76 of the Civil Practice Act.
30 4
The finding of fact by the Appellate Court in cases tried
without a jury is still final and conclusive and may not be
296 299 Ial. App. 185, 19 N.E. (2d) 844 (1939). Note, 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW REVIEW
278.
297 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 83, § 24b, added by Laws 1939, p. 702.
298 Frank v. Newburger, 298 Ill. App. 548, 19 N.E. (2d) 147 (1939). Note, 17
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 276; 27 Ill. B.J. 284, 313.
299 Kaminskas v. Cepauskis, 369 Ill. 566, 17 N.E. (2d) 558 (1938). For the
previous conflict in the Appellate Court holdings, see 17 CHICAGo-KENT LAW
REVIEW 175.
300 Before amendment, the Rule provided: "A copy of the notice by which the
appeal is perfected shall be served upon each appellee and upon any co-party
who does not appear as appellant. . . ." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1937, Ch. 110, § 259.34.
As amended the Rule requires service of notice only upon parties "who
would be adversely affected by any reversal or modification of the order,
judgment or decree. . . ." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 259.34.
301 Schafer v. Robillard, 370 Ill. 92, 17 N.E. (2d) 963 (1938). Note, 17 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW REVIEW 175.
302 Francke v. Eadie, 301 Ill. App. 254, 22 N.E. (2d) 720 (1939). Note, 18
CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEW 89.
803 299 Ill. App. 157, 19 N.E. (2d) 753 (1939). Note, 17 CHIcAao-KENT LAW REVIEW
277.
804 IM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 110, § 200.
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reviewed by the Supreme Court; nor is the Appellate Court
obliged to reverse and remand.3 °5
CREDITORS' RIGHTS
The Supreme Court handed down two significant deci-
sions with respect to the payment of interest. In Blakeslee's
Warehouses v. City of Chicago,30 6 it held, by a four to two
decision,17 that claims for interest on judgments are subject
to the five-year statute of limitations. Justices Farthing and
Orr dissented on the ground that both interest and costs are
parts of the judgment itself,308 and so subject only to the
twenty-year statute applicable to the judgment. In the other
case, People v. Farmers State Bank,30 9 the court not only
allowed creditors of an insolvent bank to recover interest
from the time of the appointment of the liquidation receiver
at the expense of the stockholders, on their double liability,
but seemingly required the expenses of liquidation to be borne
by them as well. Mr. Justice Farthing delivered the "opinion
of the court," concurred in by Justices Stone and Shaw. That
opinion proceeds upon the theory that the rule at law forbid-
ding the charging of interest "unless authorized by contract
or statute" is different from that in equity: Equity allows or
withholds interest in accordance with what is equitable and
just in view of all the circumstances in the case. Mr. Justice
Gunn concurs specially on the rather ingenious theory that
the stockholders' liability is really collateral which is avail-
able to the creditors, and that they may exhaust it first before
proceeding against the other fund, the assets of the bank, and
hence, that the interest comes not from the stockholders but
from those assets. Justices Jones, Orr, and Wilson dissented
upon the ground that under Section 6 of Article 11 of the
Constitution310 the stockholder "is obligated only for liabili-
305 Ebbert v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 369 IlL 306, 16 N.E. (2d) 749
(1938), construes Section 89 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch., 110,
§ 213) to be identical with the former practice and not to refer only to cases in
which the court finds a mere failure to prove a prima facie case.
306 369 Ill. 480, 17 N.E. (2d) 1 (1938). Notes, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REVIEw 189;
52 Harv. L. Rev. 532; 27 Ill. B.J. 238; 33 Ill. L. Rev. 854.
307 Mr. Justice Gunn did not participate.
308 Epling v. Dickson, 170 Ill. 329, 48 N.E. 1001 (1897).
309 371 Ill. 222, 20 N.E. (2d) 502 (1939).
310 "Every stockholder in a banking corporation or institution shall be individ-
ually responsible and liable to its creditors, over and above the amount of
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ties accruing while he remains a stockholder, '"311 and that
liabilities accruing subsequent to receivership are those of
the receiver and neither of the bank nor of the stockholders.
Two decisions of the Appellate Court involving body ex-
ecutions should be noted. In Pappas v. Reabus3 12 it was held
that where a special finding of malice was made against only
one of two defendants, judgment having been obtained against
both, a body execution might properly issue against the one.
The defendant relied upon Raemisch v. Askounis,313 which
invalidated such an execution on the ground that the ex-
ecution "must follow the judgment and must on its face ap-
pear to be against all the defendants against whom judgment
is entered. '" 14 The court distinguished the case upon the
ground that in that case both defendants were subject to body
execution, whereas here only one was so subject. The second
case, that of Ingalls v. Raklios,15 involves the interpretation
of the amendment to Section 5 of Chapter 77, dealing with
body executions.316 The special finding of malice was not
made at the time of the entry of judgment. 17 Justices
Denis E. Sullivan and Hebel held that since the court had
found the defendant "guilty as charged in plaintiff's state-
ment of claim" and since the complaint charged malice, the
two together constituted a sufficient finding. Mr. Justice
Burke dissented, in a brief, well-reasoned opinion based upon
stock by him or her held, to an amount equal to his or her respective shares so
held, for all its liabilities accruing while he or she remains such stockholder."
311 P. 231.
312 299 Ill. App. 499, 20 N.E. (2d) 327 (1939).
313 266 Ill. App. 611 (1932).
314 Raemisch v. Askounis was published in abstract only; the language quoted
is set out in Pappas v. Reabus, supra, at p. 501.
315 301 Ill. App. 1, 21 N.E. (2d) 856 (1939).
316 Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 77, 1 5: "No execution shall issue against
the body of the defendant, except when the judgment shall have been obtained
for a tort committed by such defendant, or unless the defendant shall have
been held to bail upon a writ of capias ad satisjaciendum Erespondendum] as
provided by law, or he shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his
creditors."
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 77, § 5: "No execution shall issue against the body of
the defendant except when the judgment shall have been obtained for a tort
committed by such defendant, and it shall appear from a special finding of the
jury, or from a special finding by the court, if the case is tried by the court
without a jury, that malice is the gist of the action, and except when the defend-
ant shall refuse to deliver up his estate for the benefit of his creditors. tAs
amended by act approved July 11, 1935. L. 1935, p. 937.)"
817 Although seemingly later a notation was made in the record: "Court makes
a special finding of malice."
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the idea that the object of the amendment was to obviate the
former objectionable practice of searching the pleadings for
the purpose of determining whether or not malice was the
gist of the action. One cannot escape the suggestion that the
majority opinion, if sustained by the Supreme Court, will
nullify one of the principal benefits of the amendment.
In Lehman v. Cottrell,31 the Appellate Court has clarified
the law with respect to the exemption of a homestead from
judgment. It held that descent of the homestead to heirs was
not equivalent to abandonment, but to a voluntary convey-
ance, 19 and that since the lien of a judgment does not attach
to the homestead in the case of a voluntary conveyance, it
will not attach upon death. Thus the judgment creditor was
denied priority in the proceeds of the sale of the homestead
to pay debts, and allowed only to share with general credi-
tors.
In Soft-Lite Lens Company, Inc., v. Ritholz32 ° the court
held that the exclusive distributor of a certain brand of tinted
glasses who sold only to certain wholesalers could enjoin a
retailer from palming off the latter's lenses as those of the
distributor. The court dismissed the defendant's contention
that the plaintiff must be a competitor of the defendant, and,
following the general rule, held that the "palming off" doc-
trine is in itself a rule of decision and not merely an aspect
of the principle of unfair competition which evolved from the
basic idea that public policy forbids one person to sell his
goods as those of another. The "palming off" doctrine is a
rule of law generally followed in Illinois and elsewhere.
The court reiterates the principle that the degree of proof
is the same in trade-mark cases as in those of unfair com-
petition. Although the Supreme Court in Candee, Swan &
Company v. Deere & Company32" ' said that in trade-mark in-
fringement cases the proof must be beyond a reasonable
doubt, the case has not been followed and evidently has been
overruled sub silentio. The court in the instant case, follow-
318 298 Ill. App. 434, 19 N.E. (2d) 111 (1939). Note, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 977.
319 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 52,. § 6: "When a homestead is conveyed by the
owner thereof, such conveyance shall not subject the premises to any lien or
incumbrance to which it would not have been subject in the hands of such
owner. .... .
320 301 Ill. App. 100, 21 N.E. (2d) 835 (1939).
321 54 Ill. 439 at 467 (1870).
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ing a previous decision, 22 makes a distinction between clear
preponderance, which is necessary, and slight preponder-
ance, which is insufficient.
Next is considered the necessity of specific proof of dam-
ages. The court applies the rule in Mossler v. Jacobs,
8 23
though it does not cite it, to the effect that the plaintiff is not
required to wait until injury has actually resulted from the
"palming off" process; that all that need be proved is that
probable customers would be misled. Several federal deci-
sions are cited in support of this holding, 'the court being sat-
isfied that the acts of the defendants if continued would re-
sult in damages injurious to the plaintiff's business.
The court, in addition to the above issues, had to consider
an issue perhaps not precisely raised before. The defendants
contended that the plaintiff's method of selling through des-
ignated licensees constituted a monopoly in restraint of trade.
The court, however, rejected this argument and thought that
the plaintiff licensed certain dealers to handle its prod-
uct in order to protect its business by designating proper
persons to handle its product. Accordingly, in effect, the
court found no controlling of prices, limitation of production,
or suppression of competition, which were discussed in
Moody & Waters Company v. Case-Moody Pie Corpora-
tion. 2 4 This ruling is in accord with Brown v. Rounsave 1,
325
which held that exclusive sales agreements are not in re-
straint of trade. 26
CONFLICT OF LAWS
The perplexing question of what law to apply in determin-
ing the validity of a contract entered into outside of this state
was considered by the Supreme and Appellate Courts in the
case of Frankel v. Allied Mills, Inc.327 The plaintiff, a li-
censed real estate broker in Illinois, having learned that the
defendant desired to sell factory property located in Peoria,
Illinois, contacted the president of defendant company in
New York. After some discussion the president orally agreed
322 The Stevens-Davis Co. v. Mather & Co., 230 Il. App. 45 (1923).
323 66 Ill. App. 571 (1896). 324 354 Il. 82, 187 N.E. 813 (1933).
325 78 IRI. 589 (1875).
S26 In accord, Southern Fire Brick Co. v. Sand Co., 223 Il. 616, 79 N.E. 313
(1906); Wieboldt v. Standard Fashion Co., 80 IIl. App. 67 (1899); and Heimbuecher
v. Goff, Homer & Co., 119 Ill. App. 373 (1905).
327 369 Ill. 578, 17 N.E. (2d) 570 (1938); 293 IlM. App. 48, 11 N.E. (2d) 979 (1937).
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that $25,000 commission would be paid if a "satisfactory deal"
was made. Further negotiations, after an agreement had
been reached with a purchaser presented by the plaintiff, re-
duced the amount of commission to $17,000. In a suit for this
commission, the defendant contended that since the sale
finally fell through no commission was due, and that the
agreement to pay a commission was illegal and void since
the plaintiff had not procured a New York real estate broker's
license. The plaintiff prevailed in the Appellate Court where
it was held that the fact that plaintiff was not licensed to
carry on the real estate business in New York was "wholly
immaterial. 328 Principal reliance was placed upon the case
of Zeigler v. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank.2 9
But the Supreme Court ordered judgment for the de-
fendant, passing only upon the question of the validity of the
contract to pay commission. The familiar language, "the
validity, construction and obligation of a contract must be
determined by the law of the place where it is made or is to
be performed," appears in the opinion.3 0 The argument of
the plaintiff that the New York statutes regulating the real
estate brokerage business applied merely to the "remedy"
as distinct from the "right" was rejected.
The question here involved concerns what is frequently
called the "essential validity" of a contract. A striking lack
of uniformity exists in the answers which American courts
have given to this question."' This lack of uniformity results
in part from a failure to examine the local rules governing the
validity of contracts critically as regards their function and
purpose.
In the present case the final result reached in the Su-
828 293 Ill. App. at p. 52.
329 245 Ill. 180, 91 N.E. 1041 (1910). In this case an Illinois physician accom-
panied his patient to California and attended her there. In a suit for his services
it was contended that he could not recover since he was not licensed to practice
medicine in California. This contention was rejected.
30 369 Ill. at p. 582.
881 Stumberg, Conflict of. Laws, 1937, p. 199 et seq.; Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws (2d ed.), 1938, p. 273. In some cases the law of the place of the making
of the contract is said to control.. In others the law of the place of performance
has been applied. In still other cases it has been said that the law the parties
intended to govern the contract will control. It is frequently said that where the
place of making and of performance coincide, the parties intended the law of
that place to govern. Cf. Am. Law Inst., Rest., Conf. Laws, § 311, 332, 347,
"the law of the place of contracting."
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preme Court seems justified.3 32 The court first examined the
New York statutes to determine their effect upon contracts
within their terms. It was concluded that the statutes rendered
contracts for commissions made by unlicensed brokers
void. 38 The court then considered the question of whether
the New York statutes were applicable to the act of a non-
resident in negotiating a sale of land situated in another
state. The legislative purpose was found to be protection of
New York vendors and purchasers against the activities of
persons not possessing proper qualifications. It was held that
the statutes applied as well to nonresidents as to residents,
and to sales of land without as well as within the state.3 If
the acts of the plaintiff were within the view of the New York
statutes, his contract to act as broker was void and could not
be the basis for a recovery of commission in Illinois. 83
Of passing interest are two cases involving the problem ot
the enforcement in Illinois of judgments obtained in other
states. In Baker v. Brown""8 the First District Appellate
Court held that a judgment obtained in Oklahoma for an
amount in excess of the amount claimed in the pleadings and
which was not responsive to the issues therein was void and
not entitled to full faith and credit in Illinois. The court refer-
red to Oklahoma decisions which held that judgments outside
the issues made by the pleadings were void when obtained in
that state. Roberts v. Sauerman Bros., Inc.,837 is a case in
which the summary judgment provisions of the Civil Practice
Act were used to secure such a judgment based upon a judg-
ment obtained in a Kentucky circuit court. Questions as to the
validity of the Kentucky proceedings were passed upon by
332 It should be noticed that the Supreme and Appellate Courts do not entirely
agree on the facts of this transaction. The Appellate Court took the view that
the contract really had its inception in Illinois instead of in New York. This
variation is no doubt responsible in some degree for the difference in result.
333 N.Y. Consol. Laws, 1930, Ch. 51, Art. 12-A, § 442-e, makes it a misde-
meanor for an unlicensed person to act as broker.
334 It should be noticed that section 440-a of these statutes applies to any
person "temporarily" acting as broker. N.Y. Consol. Laws, 1930, Ch. 51, Art. 12-A,
§ 440-a.
335 Principal reliance was placed upon the case of Burr v. Beckler, 264 IMl.
230, 106 N.E. 206 (1914).
336 298 Ill. App. 173, 18 N.E. (2d) 578 (1938).
37 370 Ill. 344, 18 N.E. (2d) 883 (1939). The Supreme Court ordered the cause
tiansferred to the Appellate Court on the ground that no constitutional question
was involved.
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the Court of Appeals of that state and were thus finally deter-
mined. The summary judgment was held proper by the Ap-
pellate Court for the First District.33
GOVERNMENT
TAXATION
At the last session the General Assembly revised the Gen-
eral Revenue Laws of the State.339 The function of this re-
vision is integration and correlation of overlapping and con-
flicting provisions of the existing laws, and not reform.
Most of the significant decisions of the Supreme Court
have concerned sales taxes. However, one very important
decision affecting the general revenue was rendered, that of
Griffin v. County of Cook,340 in which the court, in a four to
three decision, invalidated the Pre-adjudication Tax Act,34'
providing a method of confirming levies prior to the spread-
ing of the tax. The principal ground relied upon was the in-
adequacy of the provisions with respect to notice, i.e., publica-
tion. The theory was that the rates are an ingredient in per-
sonal property tax liability, and that since such liability is in
personam, the mere publication of a notice in a newspaper is
insufficient to sustain jurisdiction. Two justices,342 concur-
ring specially, gave several additional objections, i.e., that it
applies only to tax payers in the city of Chicago, that it at-
tempts to confer a nonjudicial function upon the county court,
and that in other respects it deprives the tax payer of due
process of law. These matters have been discussed in a re-
cent law review comment.
343
The new pre-adjudication statute enacted at the last ses-
sion344 probably meets the principal objection to the former
statute-insufficiency of notice-by specifying the time of
hearing in the statute itself. Whether or not the remaining ob-
jections invalidate the new act will, of course, depend upon
whether the two justices who relied only upon the obviated
338 Roberts v. Sauerman Bros., Inc., 300 Ill. App. 213, 20 N.E. (2d) 849 (1939).
339 Laws 1939, P. 886 et seq.
340 369 Ill. 380, 16 N.E. (2d) 906, 118 A.L.R. 1157 (1938). Note, 6 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 326.
341 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 110.1 et seq.
342 Stone and Farthing, JJ.
343 "The Illinois Pre-adjudication Tax Statute," 33 Ill. L. Rev. 685 (1939).
344 Laws 1939, p. 848 et seq.; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 812 et seq.
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objection will now support one of the further objections
noted in the concurring opinion or hold with the dissenting
justices concerning them. It may be well to note also that the
new statute transfers the confirmation proceedings from the
county to the circuit court. Just why this was done is not too
clear. Perhaps it was felt that, assuming validity, greater
finality would attach to a decree of a court of general jurisdic-
tion, after the device of Brown v. Jacobs. 345 It would seem,
however, that the change would tend to magnify the objec-
tion urged in the concurring opinion, that the statute at-
tempts to confer a nonjudicial function on a court.
The Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of an-
other tax provision against an objection based upon pro-
cedural due process, in Hunt Drainage District v. Schwer-
er.348 Section 34cl of the Drainage Act 47 provides, in sub-
stance, that when certain assessments are more than six
months in default, the commissioners of the district may ap-
ply to any court of competent jurisdiction "by bill or petition"
for the appointment of a receiver to collect the rents and ap-
ply them, among other things, to the payment of the delin-
quent assessments. Although the procedure for the appoint-
ment of the receiver is not prescribed, the court held that the
statute contemplated a civil procedure in equity under the
Civil Practice Act, and, as so construed, was unquestionably
valid.
Four decisions determining inclusions and exclusions un-
der the Occupational Sales Tax Act have been rendered.
3 48
The most significant of these is Revzan v. Nudelman,
349
holding the act inapplicable to a wholesale leather dealer
who sells sole leather and rubber heels to shoe repairmen,
upon the ground that the transaction is not a sale of articles
for use or consumption. It is interesting to note that the par--
ties had stipulated that the repairmen were not subject to
the tax, and that the court admits that the technique of the
present case may create a situation wherein no one will be
liable for the tax. The court said: "To hold that one party is
345 367 IlM. 545, 12 N.E. (2d) 10 (1937). See 17 CHmCAGo-KENT LAw REVmW 64.
846 369 Ml1. 330, 16 N.E. (2d) 737 (1938).
847 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 32, § 33bl.
348 IlM. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, H 440 et seq.
349 370 Ill. 180, 18 N.E. (2d) 219 (1938). Note, 17 CHicAGo-KENT LAw REVIsw 192.
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liable to a tax because another party is not liable, would be
an anomaly in the law.""35 Theretofore, it seems to have
been tacitly assumed that someone, somewhere along the
line between the producer and the actual consumer, must
pay the tax.35 ' The new attitude is reaffirmed in American
Optical Company v. Nudelman,52 holding wholesalers who
manufacture and deliver optical supplies upon prescriptions
and orders from optometrists and oculists not liable. The op-
tometrists and oculists themselves had been previously held
not liable in Babcock v. Nudelman3 53 In the present case,
the court said, citing Revzan v. Nudelman: "The fact that
eyeglasses and other optical supplies handled by optome-
trists and oculists will not be taxed at all unless we hold
wholesale opticians liable is of no significance."
In the other two cases the Supreme Court sustained li-
ability, in Acme Printing Ink Company v. Nudelman,354 with
respect to ink sold to printers, and in Smith Refining Com-
pany v. Department of Finance,35 with respect to core oil
sold to foundries, the court rejecting in each instance the
contention that the vendee did not use and consume the prop-
erty so sold, but purchased for resale.
During the past year, however, the questions of liability
have more or less yielded the stage to the problem of claims
for refund, particularly the large body of contractors' claims
resulting from the Herlihy case.3 5 Mandamus proceedings to
compel both cash refunds and credits have been sustained,
both on original proceedings in the Supreme Court in People
ex rel. Blome v. Nudelman,17 and on petition to the Circuit
Court in People ex rel. Herlihy Mid-Continent Company v.
Nudelman.38 1 It is to be noted in this connection that the
legislature has limited claims for refunds by providing that
350 P. 186.
351 See Bradley Supply Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 152, 194 N.E. 272 (1935); Blome
Co. v. Ames, 365 Ill. 456, 6 N.E. (2d) 841, 111 A.L.R. 940 (1937); and Herlihy
Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 600, 12 N.E. (2d) 638, 115 A.L.R. 485 (1937).
Notes, 16 CHICAGO-KENT REviEw 294; 32 IMI. L. Rev. 685.
352 370 Ill. 627, 19 N.E. (2d) 582 (1939).
853 367 Ill. 626, 12 N.E. (2d) 635 (1937). Note, 32 Ili. L. Rev. 685.
354 371 II. 217, 20 N.E. (2d) 277 (1939).
355 371 Ill. 405, 21 N.E. (2d) 292 (1939).
356 Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Nudelman, 367 Ill. 600, 12 N.E. (2d) 638, 115
A.L.R. 485 (1937).
857 371 Ill. 30, 19 N.E. (2d) 933 (1939).
358 370 i. 237, 18 N.E. (2d) 225 (1938).
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no erroneous payment of tax shall be credited or refunded un-
less a claim therefor is filed within three years from the date
of such payment. 59
Several decisions have been rendered concerning the
practice of the Department of Finance under Section 8 with
respect to investigations and hearings, and limiting the right
to object to the amount of the assessment to the hearing be-
fore the Board itself, or in a court on the certiorari provided
in Section 12.360
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Two cases affecting public utilities may be of consider-
able significance. In City of Chicago v. Hastings Express
Company36' the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the right
of municipalities to impose wheel taxes upon vehicles owned
and operated by public utility companies. The utility sought
to escape such taxes upon the ground that the imposition of
license taxes would constitute an interference with the ex-
clusive power of regulation of such utilities conferred by the
legislature upon the Commerce Commission. The court held
that the tax in question was not a regulatory device, but
''purely a revenue measure."
American Generator & Armature Company v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 62 while only an Appellate Court deci-
sion, passes upon a far more significant question, that of
whether reparations for overcharges on utility rates may be
sought in court in the first instance, or whether application
must be made to the Commerce Commission. In a proceed-
ing instituted in the Superior Court of Cook County, the
plaintiff charged that the defendant, a public utility engaged
in the business of selling electrical energy and lamps, in its
charges for electricity under certain rates had included and
concealed within them a charge for lamp service of half a
cent per kilowatt hour of electricity used, which made the
rates and practices in connection therewith illegal. The court
affirmed an order dismissing the complaint, on the ground
359 Laws 1939, p. 884; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 120, § 445.
360 Department of Finance v. Gold, 369 Ill. 497, 17 N.E. (2d) 13 (1938); Depart-
ment of Finance v. Cohen, 369 Ill. 510, 17 N.E. (2d) 327 (1938); and Anderson v.
Department of Finance, 370 Ill. 225, 18 N.E. (2d) 237 (1938).
861 369 Ill. 610, 17 N.E. (2d) 576 (1938).
862 298 Ill. App. 192, 18 N.E. (2d) 735 (1939).
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that recourse must first be had to the commission for the
purpose of determining the amount due. Although the court
regarded the earlier Supreme Court case of Consumers San-
itary Coffee & Butter Stores v. Commerce Commission3 63 as
controlling, it is submitted that the instant decision goes far
beyond the scope of that case.0 4 That case involved a review
and reversal of proceedings instituted before the commis-
sion itself under Section 72 of the Public Utility Act,363 and
the court very properly remanded the matter to the commis-
sion for proper action, including the determination of the
amount due. The Appellate Court felt that the Supreme Court
"in effect, adopted the same rule as that adopted by the Su-
preme Court of the United States. 3 6 It seems clear from
the brief opinion of the Consumers case that the court felt
that only one controversial question was before it-that of
the validity of the rates. However, even if Illinois be regard-
ed as committed to the federal rule, the desirability of which
can hardly be disputed, it may be queried whether that rule
would require initial recourse to the commission in the in-
stant case. Such recourse could hardly be justified either on
the basis of some discretionary question or in the interest of
promoting uniformity. It is difficult to see how either could
be involved here.0 7
863 348 Ill. 615, 181 N.E. 411 (1932).
364 In the Consumers case the Supreme Court invalidated what appear to be
the precise charges herein questioned.
365 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 111 %, § 76.
366 The court quotes from Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,
259 U.S. 285, 42 S. Ct. 477, 66 L. Ed. 943 (1922), the following passage as illustra-
tive of the federal rule: "Whenever a rate, rule, or practice is attacked as
unreasonable or as unjustly discriminatory, there must be preliminary resort to
the Commission. Sometimes this is required because the function being exer-
cised is in its nature administrative, in contradistinction to judicial. But, ordi-
narily, the determining factor is not the character of the function, but the
character of the controverted question and the nature of the inquiry necessary
for its solution. To determine what rate, rule, or practice shall be deemed
reasonable for the future is a legislative or administrative function. To deter-
mine whether a shipper has in the past been wronged by the exaction of an
unreasonable or discriminatory rate is a judicial function. Preliminary resort to
the Commission is required alike in the two classes of cases. It is required
because the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in technical
matters, and uniformity can be secured only if its determination is left to the
Commission. Moreover, that determination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous
and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance
with many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable; and such acquaint-
ance is commonly to be found only in a body of experts."
367 It will be noted that in the Merchants Elevator case so strongly relied
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MISCELLANEOUS
In Gunnell v. Palmer68 the Supreme Court held that the
provision of 1929 of the Chancery Act" 9 which authorizes the
court to appoint some competent and disinterested person as
trustee of the interests of persons not in being does not violate
due process of law, inasmuch as such persons are represent-
ed and have their day in court through the person of their
trustee.
70
In Rosen v. Rosen,3 71 the court sustained Section 137 of
the Administration Act,3 2 empowering the probate court to
sell land on which a legacy is charged, where there is not suf-
ficient personal estate for payment of the legacy. The court
pointed out that in view of the impossibility of settling the
estate without selling the land, such sale must be embraced
within the term "probate matters.
' 3
In Chicago Park District v. Canfield371 the Supreme Court
invalidated an ordinance of the Park District providing that
''no person shall drive any vehicle in the Park System upon
which there is displayed any commercial placard or ad-
vertisement of any kind" as being too broad to come within
the statutory power of the Park District to exclude "objec-
tionable travel and traffic." Seemingly the principal vice of
the ordinance lay in its failure to specify just which adver-
tising was prohibited, it being assumed that all could not be
prohibited, with the result that "the act is not complete but
leaves to the determination of the officers of the park district
what advertising comes within it and what does not."
upon, initial recourse to the commission was not required, on the ground
that the problem was merely one of law, that is, construction, and not of fact.
That case involved a suit in a state court to recover an over-cnarge. See also
Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 230 U.S. 247, 33 S. Ct. 916,
57 L. Ed. 1472 (1913); and cases collected in a note in Cases on the Law of
Public Utilities, Smith, Dowling & Hale, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, Minn.,
1936, p. 1033.
868 370 Ill. 206, 18 N.E. (2d) 202 (1938).
369 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 22, § 6. 370 See 34 Ill. L. Rev. 101.
371 370 Ill. 173, 18 N.E. (2d) 218 (1938). 372 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 3, § 139.
373 IM. Const. 1870, Art. 6, § 20: "Said courts, when established, shall have
qriginal jurisdiction of all probate matters, the settlement of estates of deceased
persons, the appointment of guardians and conservators, and settlement of their
accounts; in all matters relating to apprentices, and in cases of the sales of real
estate of deceased persons for the payment of debts."
See "Jurisdiction of the Illinois Probate Court," 17 CHCAGo-KENT LAW R1;v1w
169 (1939).
874 370 Ill. 447, 19 N.E. (2d) 376 (1939).
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In Bryan v. City of Chicago37 the Supreme Court held
valid a statute which makes cities liable for injuries to per-
sons or property caused by the negligent operation of fire de-
partment vehicles. To the objection that the statute was spe-
cial and arbitrary in that it did not apply to other municipal
vehicles, the court answered that the greater danger and
risk involved in the operation of fire department vehicles con-
stituted a reasonable basis for the classification.
In McKinely v. City of Chicago376 the Illinois Supreme
Court has unequivocally reaffirmed the doctrine that pay-
ment of salary to a de facto officer prior to determination of
the status as such of a de jure officer is a complete defense to
a claim for salary by such de jure officer during the encum-
bency of the de facto officer. 377 The plaintiff, de jure officer,
had succeeded in an election contest, and brought the present
claim for salary for the period the de facto officer was en-
cumbent.
A second interesting election case was decided by the
Supreme Court, that of Pope v. Board of Election Commis-
sioners, 8 involving not the right to office or its emolu-
ments, but the right to vote. The court held that mere "domi-
cile" and "residence ' 379 were not synonymous and gave
strict effect to the provision 380 that "a permanent abode is
necessary to constitute a residence ....
In Thrift, Inc. v. State Bank & Trust Company,8 2 the
Appellate Court declined to enforce a contract between the
defendant bank and the plaintiff, a corporation engaged in
the promotion of school savings, to install and maintain a
system by which deposits would be received in the schools
and transmitted to the defendant bank's messengers, upon
the ground that the system contemplated branch banking in
violation of the Illinois statute."s The decision is probably in-
correct, in view of a specific proviso in another portion of the
875 371 11. 64, 20 N.E. (2d) 37 (1939).
376 369 Ill. 268, 16 N.E. (2d) 727 (1938). Note, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 537.
377 See Hittell v. City of Chicago, 327 Il. 443, 158 N.E. 683, 55 A.L.R. 994 (1927);
also, note, 55 A.L.R. 997.
378 370 Ill. 196, 18 N.E. (2d) 214 (1938).
379 Ill. Const. 1870, Art. 7, § 1; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 46, § 65.
380 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 46, § 66.
381 See note, 27 Ill. B.J. 345.
882 298 IM. App. 501, 19 N.E. (2d) 126 (1939).
883 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, CI. 16%, § 9.
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statute apparently sanctioning school savings arrange-
ments,38 4 a provision which court and counsel seem to have
overlooked entirely.
s85
In People v. Board of Supervisors,35 the Appellate Court
held that the board has no discretion in the matter of making
payments under the provisions of the Blind Relief Act,8 7 that
the duties imposed upon them are ministerial and that a par-
ty who brings himself within the provisions of the act can
compel the performance of such duties by mandamus, and
that a judgment is not a condition precedent to the right to
maintain such proceeding.
384 IMI. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 16 , § 16: "... nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prohibit banks incorporated under the laws of this State or of the
United States from appointing natural persons as agents to receive deposits of
savings in and through the public schools."
885 See note, 6 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 688.
386 299 Ill. App. 575, 20 N.E. (2d) 904 (1939).
387 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 22, §§ 279 et seq.
